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This dissertation studies the effect of heterogeneity in consumer in-
comes on outcomes in vertically differentiated markets. When products are
differentiated in quality, the consumer’s choice of a particular product is a
function of her income. Thus, the distribution of incomes plays an important
role in shaping the demand for individual products in vertically differentiated
markets.
The first two chapters of the dissertation study the demand for passen-
ger cars and trucks in the US. These vehicles are differentiated by quality that
depends on vehicle’s age. The first chapter studies the relationship between
the distribution of consumer incomes and the distribution of vehicle vintages
using a dynamic, heterogeneous agents model. The model predicts that higher
per capita incomes are associated with younger vehicle stocks, if the vehicle
ownership rates are high. If the per capita incomes are low, and so are the
vi
endogenous vehicle ownership rates, increases in income may lead to the ag-
ing of vehicles, by encouraging entry of lower income consumers into vehicle
ownership via purchases of older vehicles. Higher levels of income inequality
are associated with older vehicle stocks.
The second chapter of the dissertation asks whether some of the ob-
served increases in the average age of vehicles in the US can be attributed to
the rise in real consumer incomes and the resulting changes in the composition
of demand for different vehicle vintages. The dynamic, non-stationary, hetero-
geneous agents model, estimated on the aggregate vehicle ownership data for
the US over the 1967-2001 period, provides a positive answer to this question.
The third chapter of the dissertation studies the effect of inequality in
consumer incomes on firms’ entry, location, and pricing decisions in a static
oligopoly model of vertically differentiated products. This paper computes the
Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game similar to Shaked and Sutton (1982),
to find that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more
firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. The
consumption inequality is lower and the aggregate consumer welfare is higher
in economies with greater income inequality.
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Chapter 1
From Consumer Incomes to Car Ages: How
the Distribution of Income Affects the
Distribution of Vehicle Vintages
Expenditures on motor vehicles comprise the largest part of consumer
expenditures on durable goods.1 The durability property allows a vehicle to
yield utility over a prolonged period of time, and potentially to more than one
owner during its lifetime. This chapter studies the role of consumer incomes in
vehicle ownership decisions, such as the age of the vehicle at the time of pur-
chase and the length of the ownership period, and the aggregate implications
of these decisions for the distribution of vehicle vintages.
The relationship between per capita incomes and vehicle ages has been
studied previously by environmental engineers in Miller et al. [15]. The de-
terminants of the vehicle age distribution are of interest to the environmental
scholars, since ages of vehicles are positively related to the emission levels.
Miller et al. [15] find a strong negative relationship between mean per capita
incomes and median vehicle ages for counties in Tennessee, with correlation
coefficients of −0.996 for passenger cars and −0.979 for light trucks. At the
1Approximately 45% on average since the 1950s for the US.
1
cross-country level, Storchmann [22] finds that car prices depreciate slower in
developing countries than in industrialized countries, and that the economic
life of automobiles is negatively related to real incomes. At the micro level,
Adda and Cooper [1] use data on French household vehicle replacement de-
cisions to find that higher-income households are more likely to replace their
vehicles, controlling for the vehicle’s age.
This chapter presents additional evidence from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey on the importance of income in vehicle ownership decisions. It
uses a model that can generate predictions consistent with the empirical evi-
dence at both individual and aggregate levels, to study how the distribution
of consumer incomes affects the distribution of vehicle vintages. The model
is dynamic, with infinitely lived, heterogeneous in income agents. The agents
are allowed to own up to one vehicle at a time, and can trade both new and
used vehicles. The vehicles are differentiated by age, and younger vehicles are
assumed to be superior to the older ones in terms of quality. The prices of
vehicles decline with age at an endogenous rate.
The agent’s decisions depend on his income and prices of vehicles. The
incomes of different agent types are calibrated to match the empirical income
distribution for the US in 2001.2 Aggregation across individual agents de-
termines demand for different vehicle vintages, and the resulting vehicle age
2The year 2001 was chosen since it is the last year for which R.L. Polk & Co. provided
the data on the distribution of motor vehicles by model year to the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook. Thus, these are the most recent age distribution data that are publicly available.
2
distribution. The model’s parameters are calibrated to match vehicle owner-
ship data for 2001. The model generates a strong negative relationship between
agents’ incomes and the ages of vehicles owned.
The estimated model is then used to study how changes in the under-
lying distribution of consumer incomes affect the aggregate vehicle ownership
statistics, in particular, the mean and median ages of the vehicle stock. The
model predicts that higher levels of income inequality lead to older vehicle
stocks. If the initial incomes are low, increasing mean income may lead to the
aging of vehicles by encouraging entry of lower income consumers into vehi-
cle ownership via purchases of older vehicles. Beyond a certain income level,
however, economies with higher mean incomes have younger vehicle stocks.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: Section 1.1 presents micro level
evidence of a negative relationship between incomes and holdings of vehicle
vintages, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey data on household vehicle
ownership for 2001. Section 1.2 describes the model. Section 1.3 discusses the
solution method, while Section 1.4 focuses on the estimation procedure and
data used in the estimation. Section 1.5 presents the results and analyzes the
model’s predictions for the US in 2001. In Section 1.6, the moments of the
income distribution are varied to generate predictions for the aggregate vehicle
ownership patterns, including the mean and median ages of the total vehicle
stock. This section also contains some empirical evidence on the relationship
between moments of the income distribution and vehicle registrations. Section
1.7 concludes.
3
1.1 Evidence: Consumer Incomes and Vehicle Owner-
ship Decisions
The data on vehicle ownership by households in the US for 2001 were
obtained from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) [6]. The survey is
administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and includes detailed
information on expenditures for over 7, 000 households in the given year. The
household characteristics and income data are part of the Interview Survey
component of the CE; the data for this component are collected on a quarterly
basis, with households in the sample interviewed every three months over a
fifteen-month period. However, income questions are asked only in the first
and fourth quarter. The data on household size, number of earners, geographic
location and population, age of the reference person, and total income before
taxes over the past twelve months were chosen for every household interviewed
in the first quarter. The households with incomplete income responses were
removed from the sample, resulting in the sample size of 6, 381 units.
The data on vehicles owned or leased by each of the households are
reported in the Detailed Expenditure Files component of the survey. The
survey asks detailed questions about every household vehicle, including its
make and model year, the year it was purchased, and whether it was new
or used at the time of purchase. The information on the vehicle’s model
year is particularly important for the purposes of this project, since it is used
to compute the age of the vehicle. Unfortunately, the model year is recorded
precisely only for the model years 1986 or newer, with the survey giving ranges
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for older vintages. Thus, the methods for censored data need to be used to
perform the analysis.
The household decision on whether to own or lease a vehicle is modeled
with a probit regression. The independent variables include the income and the
squared income of the household, the household size, the number of earners,
the dummy variables for geographic location and population size, and the age
and the age squared of the reference person. The dependent variable is an
indicator that equals one if the household owns or leases at least one vehicle.
The results are presented in Column I of Table 1.1. They demonstrate that
higher-income households are more likely to own or lease a vehicle, and that
the effect is non-linear in income. Households with a larger number of earners
are more likely to be vehicle-owners, possibly because they need this transport
mode in order to get to work. Also, households in urban locations have greater
excess to alternative means of transportation, such as public transport, and
thus are less likely to have a vehicle. More expensive parking and maintenance
may also discourage vehicle ownership in urban locations.
The tobit model for censored data was used to study the ages of vehicles
owned by households. The results in Column II in Table 1.1 demonstrate
that higher-income households tend to have younger vehicles. The results in
Columns III and IV of Table 1.1 indicate that this is due to higher-income
households being more likely to purchase a new vehicle instead of a used one,
and hold on to this vehicle for a fewer number of years.3 A positive and
3The analysis for the number of years a vehicle is held was restricted to the vehicles that
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Table 1.1: Modeling household vehicle ownership decisions
Independent
variable
I. Probit:
Own a
vehicle
II. Tobit:
Vehicle’s
age
III.
Probit:
Pur-
chased
used
IV. OLS:
Number
of years
own new
Income, $1000
0.0203 −0.0525 −0.0140 −0.0115
(15.86) (−18.8) (−20.27) (−2.51)
Income squared
−0.00004 0.00011 0.00003 0.00003
(−12.18) (11.47) (13.55) (1.71)
Number of
earners
0.2062 −0.2253 0.0856 −0.3536
(5.41) (−2.92) (4.62) (−2.71)
Urban location
−0.2258 −0.1815 −0.0126 −0.1473
(−2.09) (−0.76) (−0.21) (−0.29)
Num. of other
vehicles
1.0606 0.1359 0.5280
(20.93) (11) (4.42)
R2 0.1899 0.0203 0.0975 0.0824
Number of
obs.
6, 381 10, 334 10, 283 3, 757
1) t-statistics are given in parentheses.
2) Other controls include a constant, family size, geographic location and population dummies, origin
of the vehicle (Domestic, European or Asian) and luxury vehicle dummies, truck indicator, age and age
squared of the reference person.
highly significant coefficient on the number of other vehicles owned or leased
by the household shows that vehicles of different ages may be substitutes at
the household level. The coefficient values for this variable in Columns III and
IV of the table indicate that households with more vehicles are more likely to
purchase a larger fraction of them used, and also tend to replace each of the
vehicles less frequently.
were new when purchased. The reason is that, in general, the number of years a vehicle is
held depends on the age of the vehicle, so the sample was limited to control for this effect.
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The above analysis demonstrates that income plays an important role
in vehicle ownership decisions at the level of the consumption unit, including
the ages of vehicles held. The next part of the chapter presents a simple
model that generates the relationships between income and vehicle ownership
decisions of the same sign as the ones observed in the data.
1.2 Model
The economy is populated with a finite number of infinitely lived het-
erogeneous agent types j = 1, ..., N . Each agent type j consists of a unit
measure of identical consumers. The time period in the model is equal to one
year. In every period t, agents of type j are endowed with income yj, which is
deterministic and constant over time. The agent types are ordered according
to their income levels so that y1 < y2 < ... < yN .
In every period the agents decide on their consumption of non-durable
and durable goods. The durable goods are vehicles heterogeneous in age a =
1, ..., A. A vehicle of age a = 0 is a new vehicle and its price p0 is exogenous
in every period.4 The agents can trade both new and used vehicles. A used
vehicle of age a > 0 is traded at price pa = p0 exp(−τa), where τ parameterizes
the rate of price depreciation.
4As in Adda and Cooper ([1] and [2]), the supply of new vehicles is assumed to be charac-
terized by a constant returns to scale production function. Together with the assumption of
constant mark-ups, this implies that the price of a new vehicle is independent of the demand
for new vehicles. This assumption of the exogenous new vehicle’s price greatly simplifies the
analysis. However, it may be too strong, since the time-series analysis shows that moments
of the distribution of vehicle vintages significantly predict future prices of new vehicles.
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In every period the agents derive utility from consuming non-durable
goods c and vehicle vintages a according to the following utility function:
U (a, c) = v (a) + u (c) , (1.1)
where
v (a) =
{
exp (−ηa2) , if a = 0, ..., A
0, if a > A
(1.2)
and
u (c) =
(
c
λ
)1−γ
1− γ . (1.3)
The utility from vehicle ownership is discontinuous at age A, with the assump-
tion that agents derive no utility from consuming a vehicle older than A.5 The
functional form for v is motivated by the percentage of total US vehicle stock
remaining in use as a function of age. For small values of η the utility de-
clines slowly in the earlier stages of vehicle’s life, then picks up the pace in
midlife, and slows down again when the vehicle is old.6 The utility from the
consumption of nondurables has a CRRA form with a scale factor λ.
5An upper bound on vehicle’s useful life is necessary for computational reasons. However,
for A sufficiently large this assumption is not restrictive. The results here were obtained for
A = 30.
6Greenspan and Cohen [10] use a similar functional form to estimate the scrappage of
vehicles. They find that it fits the data well everywhere except for the higher ranges of
vehicle ages, where it declines too fast resulting in the tail that is not ”thick” enough.
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Each agent of type j arrives in a period with a vehicle of age a.7 In the
beginning of the period, he decides whether to retain this vehicle or replace
it with a vehicle of vintage a′. Whatever his decision, next period he starts
with a vehicle that is one year older than the one he consumes in the current
period. Formally, in every period each agent of type j solves:
Vj (a) = max
a′=0,...,A+1
{v (a′) + u (yj + pia − pa′) + β Vj (a′ + 1)} , (1.4)
where
pia =
{
pa, if a = a
′
φpa, otherwise, φ < 1
(1.5)
is the selling price of vehicle aged a, with φ parameterizing the fraction
of value recovered by consumer from selling his current vehicle. The option of
not owning a vehicle is embedded in the problem’s setup. If the agent derives
no utility from owning a vehicle that is older than A and the price pa>A = 0,
then holding a vehicle aged a > A is equivalent to having no vehicle.
Trade in the secondary market is motivated by the differences in con-
sumer incomes. The decisions of which vintages to replace and which ones
to hold on to depend on the prices of vehicle vintages. Ideally, these prices
7In this setup, the agent is allowed to own at most one vehicle. The results in Table 1
show that the number of vehicles owned plays an important role in the decisions on what
vehicle vintages to hold and how often to replace them. Thus, modeling vehicle ownership
decisions at the individual level with the assumption of at most one vehicle per agent may
be restrictive.
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should be such that the markets clear for every vintage. However, this is a very
difficult problem due to the linkages between markets for all vintages. Lican-
dro, Puch and Sampayo [14] obtain analytical solution for the market-clearing
price in a simpler model of a secondary market for vehicles with only two
types of agents. The model presented here is more general, and the approach
is to approximate the equilibrium price function with an exponential function
pa = p0 exp(−τa). The depreciation rate τ is estimated within the model with
a moment condition that supply equals demand at given prices across vintages.
The cost of this approach is that the prices and the decision rules obtained
with it are not the equilibrium solutions, but rather their approximations.
1.3 Solving the Model
For every agent type j = 1, ..., N the decision rules a′ = fj (a), where
fj : [1, ..., A+ 2] → [0, ..., A+ 1], can be solved for using the value function
iteration method. These decision rules are then used to obtain the steady-state
holdings of vehicle ages a˜j.
If the transaction cost to replacing a vehicle is positive (φ < 1), the
agents may choose to hold a vehicle for several periods, that is, a˜j is a vector.
In general, the number of periods will depend on the income level. Let Tj ∈
[1, A+ 1] denote the steady-state number of periods a vehicle is held by every
agent of type j. If Tj 6= Tk for some j 6= k, the holdings of different agent
types need to be weighted accordingly in order to obtain aggregate predictions
for the distribution of vehicle vintages in the steady state.
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To illustrate, suppose that there are only two types of agents, X and
Y , and the agents of type X have a higher income than the agents of type Y .
Suppose also that in the steady state the agents of type X replace their current
vehicle with a new one in every period, so that TX = 1 and a˜X = 0. For agents
of type Y , the vector of the steady-state vehicle age holdings a˜Y = [0 1] is of
length TY = 2, that is, the agents of type Y replace their vehicle with a new
one every other period.
The weight assigned to the agents of type X is the least common mul-
tiple of TX and TY , equal to 2. For agents of type Y , the weight assigned
to the agents with a new vehicle is 1, and the weight assigned to the agents
with a one-year old vehicle is also 1. This way, there are equal measures of
agents of each type in the steady state. For computational purposes, this is
equivalent to saying that in the steady state there are three agents purchasing
a new vehicle (two agents of type X and one agent of type Y ) and one agent
holding a one-year old vehicle. Thus, in the steady state, three quarters of the
total vehicle stock are new and one quarter of vehicles is one year old. The per
capita vehicle holdings can be computed by dividing the total vehicle stock,
which is 4 in this case, by the total weighted number of agents (also 4).
In general, let T denote the least common multiple of T1, ..., TN . The
weight assigned to the holdings of agent type j with a vehicle of age a˜j (tj),
where tj = 1, ..., Tj, is equal to
(
T/Tj
)
for every element of a˜j. The distribution
of vehicle ages is computed using these weight assignments, similar to the
example above with agents X and Y .
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1.4 Estimation
The economic environment is characterized by a set of parameters. Pa-
rameters describing the income distribution and prices of new vehicles in 2001{
{yj}j=1,...,N , p0
}
are estimated from the data. The preference parameters
{η, γ, λ} are chosen to match the data moments on the total number of vehicles
registered per capita, the new vehicle registrations per capita, and the mean
age of vehicles, all for 2001. The price depreciation parameter τ is estimated
with a moment condition that supply should equal demand at given prices
across vintages.
The remaining parameters are the number of agent types N , the upper
bound on vehicle ages A, the fraction of the vehicle value recovered by the
agent φ, and the time discount rate β. Parameter values N = 100 and A =
30 are chosen to optimize on the computational time, while still resulting in
meaningful predictions from the model. The annual discount rate β = 0.96 is
chosen to match previous studies. In the price data from Kelley Blue Book and
Edmunds.com, the wedge between the trade-in and retail values is anywhere
from 5% to 10%. Here I assume that it is 7%, and set parameter φ = 0.93.
Next I describe the procedure and data used to estimate{
{yj}j=1,...,N , p0, η, γ, λ
}
.
1.4.1 Parameters estimated outside the model
The income distribution in 2001 is approximated with a lognormal den-
sity function, with parameters µ and σ calibrated to match two moments from
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the data, the mean household income and the Gini coefficient in 2001. These
data were obtained from the Historical Income Tables compiled by the US
Census Bureau from the Annual Social and Economics Supplements to the
Current Population Survey. The estimated lognormal distribution function
was used to calculate the mean household incomes for each of the 100 per-
centiles. The number of people per household is positively correlated with
income. Thus, to account for these differences in household size by income
groups, the mean incomes of households were computed in per capita terms.
The average number of people over the age of 16 by income percentiles was
obtained from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. These estimates were used
to calculate the mean incomes per person over the age of 16 for each of the
income percentiles {yj}j=1,...,100.
The price of a new vehicle, p0, comes from the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook [24]. The estimate used is the average expenditure per new car in
2001.
1.4.2 Parameters estimated within the model
The values of preference parameters η, γ, and λ are chosen to bring
the model’s aggregate predictions as close as possible to the data on the total
number of vehicles per capita, the new vehicle registrations per capita, and the
mean ages of vehicles in 2001. These statistics are published by the Ward’s
Automotive Yearbook [24], and the original source of the data is R.L. Polk &
Co.
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The data are presented separately for cars and trucks. For the purposes
of this project, the numbers of cars and trucks were added to obtain aggregate
statistics. The total number of vehicles and the new vehicle registrations were
divided by the civilian noninstitutional population over sixteen years of age
acquired from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to obtain per capita values of
these data moments. The data on the mean age of vehicles are also presented
separately for cars and trucks. The mean age of the total vehicle stock was
computed as the weighted average of the mean ages of cars and trucks, with
fractions of each vehicle type as weights.
The estimation procedure seeks to minimize the distance between the
data and the model’s predictions in the least squares sense. The criterion used
is a weighted sum of the distances between actual and predicted moments, with
each component weighted by the empirical inverse of the moment’s variance
from the trend over a 35 year period (1967-2001).
The moment for the market clearing conditions across vehicle ages was
also added to the criterion. The moment used to estimate τ is the distance be-
tween supply and demand, averaged over vehicle vintages. The final criterion
was minimized via the simplex algorithm due to Nelder and Mead [17].
1.5 Results
The estimated parameter values and moments from both model and
data are presented in Table 1.2. The model has a total of 100 agents, so in
per capita terms it can generate predictions with a maximum of two non-
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zero elements after the decimal point. With the assumption of at most one
vehicle per person, the model cannot generate more than 1 vehicle per capita.
The estimated model predicts 0.99 vehicles per capita, versus 1.0074 vehicles
per capita observed in the data.8 The model does well matching two other
data moments, the new vehicle registrations per capita and the average age of
vehicles.
The estimated rate of price depreciation τ is equal to 0.1694. For
comparison, Cooper and Adda [2] estimate τ = 0.2 using the Kelley Blue Book
Data. At this value of the parameter, 8.9% off all vehicles are misallocated,
meaning that they are either in excess supply or demand. This is a measure
of distance from the equilibrium, and it is arguably not too large.
Table 1.2: Estimation results
Parameter Estimate Moment (2001) Model Data
λ 15, 733 Total veh., PC 0.9900 1.0074
η 0.0006 New veh., PC 0.0800 0.0813
γ 3.4755 Mean age of veh. 8.5859 8.6
Least sq. dist. % misall.
τ 0.1694 Market clearing 1.7176e− 005 8.9226
Figure 1.1 plots the average ages of vehicles held by income percentiles,
8The data on the total vehicle stock in the US obtained from the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook includes all motor vehicles, including heavy trucks and buses. The data on the
number of passenger cars and light trucks only would be more suitable for the purposes of
this project; however, this data is not publicly available. The estimate obtained from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2001 puts the number of vehicles per person over the
age of 16 at around 0.9. This is likely to be a lower estimate, since the survey tends to
oversample from the lower income part of the population.
15
from lowest to highest. The model predicts a strong negative relationship
between income and ages of vehicles owned. The predicted average ages of
vehicles are the outcome of two decisions: what vehicle vintage to buy and how
long to keep it for. Figure 1.2 depicts these decisions by income percentiles.
Figure 1.2a shows that higher-income consumers choose to purchase younger
vehicles. In Figure 1.2b, the number of years a vehicle is held is not strictly
monotone in income, since it depends on the age of the vehicle at the time
of purchase. However, overall there is a negative relationship between income
and the frequency of replacement.
Figure 1.1: Average age of vehicles owned by income
percentiles
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Figure 1.2: Decision rules by income percentiles
Figure 1.3: Age distribution of vehicles
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To evaluate the fit of the model, additional statistics from both model
and data have been computed and compared. Figure 1.3 plots the age distri-
bution of vehicles in 2001. The data on the distribution of vehicles in use by
model year have been obtained from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. All of
the vehicles 15 years of age and older are grouped together in the data, so the
same aggregation was done for the vehicle ages generated by the model. The
two distributions look similar, so the conclusion is that the model does well
matching the distribution of vehicle vintages in the US in 2001.
On the other hand, the model generates a much stronger negative re-
lationship between consumer incomes and ages of vehicles held than the one
observed in the data. Figure 1.4 plots the average ages of vehicles owned by
income percentiles from model and data. The data come from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey for 2001. The model also significantly underpredicts the
average number of years a vehicle has been held, 1.6 in the model versus 4.8
in the data. A modification of the model with larger monetary and/or utility
costs to replacing a vehicle would result in a higher value for the average num-
ber of years a vehicle is held, as well as a less dramatic relationship between
incomes and ages of vehicles owned. Another option would involve changing
the utility function for vehicle ownership. The current functional form assumes
that the utility from vehicle ownership declines every year a vehicle is owned,
and at increasingly higher rates at the later stages of a vehicle’s life.
The model also assumes that the agents cannot own more than one
vehicle at a time, and that all vehicles of the same vintage are homogeneous.
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Allowing for additional dimensions of quality differentiation and/or ownership
of multiple vehicles would give higher-income agents other options for increas-
ing their utility from vehicle ownership, besides buying a younger vehicle.
Thus, these modifications of the model would also produce a weaker relation-
ship between incomes and ages of vehicles held. However, computationally,
this would be a much more difficult task.
For the purposes of this project, a simpler model is sufficient to evaluate
the direction, if not the magnitude, of the effect of changes in the distribution
of income on the distribution of vehicle vintages.
Figure 1.4: Average age of vehicles by income per-
centiles, model and data, 2001
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1.6 Changing the Income Distribution
This part of the chapter studies how changes in the distribution of
consumer incomes affect aggregate vehicle ownership patterns, with particular
interest in the predictions for the mean age of the total vehicle stock. Subsec-
tion 1.6.1 considers the effect of changing the mean household income relative
to the 2001 benchmark, holding the level of income inequality and the price of
a new vehicle fixed at their US in 2001 levels. In Subsection 1.6.2, the mean
household income and a new vehicle’s price are the same as in 2001, and it is
the level of income inequality that is allowed to vary.
In both subsections, the values of preference parameters η, γ, and λ
are as estimated in the benchmark model. The price depreciation parameter
τ , however, is reestimated for every change in the income distribution with
a moment condition that the demand should equal the supply across vehicle
vintages.9
Subsection 1.6.3 tests the model’s predictions for the total number of
vehicles and the sales of new vehicles using the data for fifty states. The state-
level data on vehicle ownership were obtained from the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook [24], and the income data come from the summary tables for the
2002 American Community Survey administered by the U.S. Census Bureau.
9Suppose that the price of a new vehicle is set globally, while the trade in used vehicles
is limited to the boundaries of a given economy.
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1.6.1 Mean Household Income and Vehicle Ownership
This subsection studies how changes in mean household income affect
the model’s predictions for the total number of vehicles owned per capita,
the new vehicle sales per capita, and the mean age of vehicles. The mean
household income is allowed to vary relative to the 2001 benchmark, from
25% of the 2001 level, to 200%. The parameters of the lognormal density
function were reestimated to match each level of mean household income and
the same value for the Gini coefficient as in 2001. The estimated distribution
functions were used to calculate mean per capita incomes for each of the 100
percentiles via the same procedure as described in Section 1.4.1.
For each value of the mean household income, the price depreciation
parameter τ was reestimated using the average of market clearing conditions
across vehicle vintages. Figure 1.5 shows that prices tend to depreciate faster in
higher-income economies, a result consistent with the findings of Storchmann
[22]. The uneven shape of the line is the outcome of a discrete number of
agent types (100), and only a fraction of them making buying and selling
decisions in every economy. The low-income economies have the majority of
consumers with very low incomes. If prices were to depreciate faster, these
consumers would purchase very old vehicles. However, there would not be a
sufficient number of higher-income consumers purchasing younger vehicles and
supplying the older ones, so the value of the market clearing moment would be
large. A lower value is obtained when the price depreciation rate is small, and
the lower-income consumers choose to not own a vehicle. As incomes grow,
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prices depreciate faster to stimulate demand for older vintages.
Figure 1.5: Price depreciation rate τ and mean house-
hold income
Figure 1.6a shows a significant increase in per capita vehicle ownership
over this range of relative mean income values, and Figure 1.6b shows that
the new vehicle sales are increasing in relative income. The jagged nature of
the new vehicle sales line is due to a small sample size, since only a few agent
types choose to purchase a new vehicle in every economy.
Figure 1.7 shows that the mean age of vehicles is non-monotone in mean
household income. In low-income economies, increases in mean income may
lead to the aging of the vehicle stock. This is due to the lower-income con-
sumers choosing to become vehicle owners for the first time as their incomes
increase. These consumers choose to hold older vehicles, so their decisions
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Figure 1.6: Mean household income and the total num-
ber of vehicles and sales of new vehicles per
capita
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shift the mass of the age distribution towards older vintages. The jagged na-
ture of the predicted average age in low-income economies is again due to a
small number of households choosing to own a vehicle. For the economies with
the mean income above a certain level, and with the majority of consumers
owning a vehicle, additional increases in income result in the younger vehicle
stock. Thus, the average age of vehicles declines in the mean income, when
the mean income is above this threshold value. The result for the median ages
of vehicles is consistent with findings by Miller et al. [15] of a negative rela-
tionship between per capita incomes and median ages of vehicles for counties
in Tennessee.
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Figure 1.7: Mean and median ages of vehicles and mean
household income
1.6.2 Income Inequality and Vehicle Ownership
In this subsection, the mean household income and the price of a new
vehicle are the same as in the benchmark model, and the Gini coefficient is
allowed to vary from 0.19 to 0.74, which corresponds to the largest range of
values for this coefficient measured across countries.10 As before, the incomes
of agent types j = 1, ..., 100 for each value of the Gini coefficient were computed
using the estimates for the lognormal distribution function.
10See the United Nations Development Programme’s ”Human Development Report” for
2006 and 2007/2008 [23].
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Figure 1.8: Price depreciation rate τ and income in-
equality
Figure 1.8 shows that the price depreciation rate τ is increasing in the
degree of income inequality. Figure 1.9 illustrates the relationship between
income inequality and the distribution of vehicle vintages with an example of
four economies with different values for the Gini coefficient. The blue solid
lines in the graphs are the income probability density functions, and the grey
shaded areas represent the vehicle age distributions. When the value of the
Gini coefficient is low, the income distribution is more concentrated around the
mean. Low degree of income heterogeneity means that consumers are more
similar to each other. Thus, they make similar vehicle ownership decisions
and the resulting vehicle age distribution is also concentrated. Higher values
of the price depreciation parameter τ would lead to the majority of consumers
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wanting to purchase older vehicles. However, the supply of these vehicles would
be low, due to a much smaller number of higher-income consumers. Therefore,
in the economies with low degree of income heterogeneity, price depreciation
rate needs to be low in order to induce purchases of newer vehicles.
Figure 1.9: Income inequality and vehicle age distribu-
tion
Higher variability in incomes results in higher variability in prices of
vehicles, through larger values of the price depreciation parameter τ . More
dispersed income distributions lead to greater heterogeneity in vehicle age
holdings. Figure 1.10 shows that the number of vehicles per capita declines
slightly in income inequality, while the sales of new vehicles are non-monotone.
Overall, there is a declining pattern for the sales of new vehicles over the
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Figure 1.10: Income inequality and the total number
of vehicles and sales of new vehicles per
capita
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whole range of the Gini coefficient values; however, there are significantly
large regions with the new sales increasing or approximately constant.
The mean and median ages of vehicles are depicted in Figure 1.11. The
model predicts that the vehicle stocks should be older in the economies with
higher levels of income inequality. As income inequality increases, the mass
of the income distribution shifts to the left, so the majority of the population
becomes relatively more poor. Their decisions cause the mean and median
ages of the vehicles to increase.
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Figure 1.11: Mean and median ages of vehicles and in-
come inequality
1.6.3 Vehicle ownership and sales of new vehicles: model and data
This subsection compares the model’s predictions for the total number
of vehicles per capita and the sales of new vehicles per capita to these statistics
at the state level.
The state-level data on vehicle ownership were obtained from theWard’s
Automotive Yearbook [24]. This publication presents the data on vehicle reg-
istrations and sales separately for cars and trucks for every state. For the
purposes of this exercise, the data for cars and trucks were combined to ob-
tain data for all motor vehicles. The per capita numbers were generated by
dividing the aggregate values by the total number of people sixteen years of
age and older, obtained from the 2001 American Community Survey.
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The average number of vehicles per person over the age of sixteen for
fifty states is high at 1.05. For comparison, the statistic used for the estimation
at the country level is 1.0074. The higher values at the state level are due to
the state-level population data being limited to the household population only.
American Community Survey excludes the population living in institutions,
college dormitories, and other group quarters from its population estimates.
As long as the fractions of population covered by the survey are approximately
the same across the states, the analysis in this section should still be valid.
The average number of new vehicle sales per person over the age of sixteen is
0.08, similar to the country level statistic. This suggests that the discrepancy
in the population numbers is not that large.
The income data were obtained from the 2002 American Community
Survey. The data on the fractions of households in different income groups
were used to compute the state-level Gini coefficients, as well as to obtain the
average per capita incomes for each percentile and state. For every state, the
computed incomes of N = 100 agent types were fed into the model, to obtain
predictions for the total number of vehicles per capita and the sales of new
vehicles per capita.
Are the relationships between the moments of the income distribution
and the vehicle ownership patterns similar in model and data? To address this
question, the reduced form analysis has been performed separately for vehicle
ownership data and the model’s predictions. Table 1.3 presents results from
the regression analysis of the total number of vehicles registered per capita on
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the average household income and the Gini coefficient. Table 1.4 contains the
results from a similar exercise for the sales of new vehicles per capita.
The results in column I of Table 1.3 show that in the data, the num-
ber of vehicle registrations per capita does not depend on the state’s average
household income or the level of income inequality. Other controls include
the average household size, the population density, the fraction of population
employed, and an indicator for the state containing at least one city with
population over a million. Only the last two variables significantly affect the
state-level vehicle registrations.
The coefficients on the average household income and the Gini coeffi-
cient are not significant. The most likely explanation for this rather surprising
finding is that at these high levels of income, vehicle ownership is also very
high, and is no longer affected by small variations in income. The majority of
consumers can afford to have a vehicle of some age as long as they want one.
The desire to have a vehicle is stronger among consumers living in rural areas
and needing a convenient transport mode to get to work.
As expected, the model predicts a positive relationship between the
average household income and the number of vehicles registered per capita at
the state level. Also, higher levels of income inequality have a negative effect
on vehicle ownership. The variation in the predicted number of vehicles per
capita is very low. For 29 states, the predicted number of vehicles per person
is equal to 1. For the rest of them it is equal to 0.99, with the exception
of Louisiana, for which it is 0.98. The overall conclusion from Table 1.3 is
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that when incomes are high, the model is not a good tool for explaining the
differences in the per capita vehicle registration numbers across regions.
Table 1.3: OLS: Total vehicle registrations by
state.
Model versus data, 2001
Independent variable I. Data II. Model
Average HH
income, $1000
−0.0028 0.0002
(−1.02) (3.46)
Gini coef.
−0.4718 −0.0825
(−0.67) (−4.23)
Fraction empl.
1.3556
(2.35)
City over mil.
−0.0759
(−2.58)
R2 0.4524 0.5105
Number of obs. 50 50
1) t-statistics are given in parentheses.
2) Other controls for the data regression include average house-
hold size and population density. Both regressions also include a
constant.
Table 1.4 presents the results for the per capita sales of new vehicles.
In both model and data, the effect of the average household income is positive
and significant. The model predicts a stronger relationship, however, with a
larger value for the coefficient on the average household income. The Gini
coefficient is not significant in neither data nor model. This is consistent with
the results in Figure 1.10b for the predicted new sales in this range of values
for the Gini coefficient (from 0.38 to 0.51). The correlation between the new
vehicle sales in the model and data is equal to 0.54.
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Table 1.4: OLS: New vehicle registrations by state.
Model versus data, 2001
Independent variable I. Data II. Model
Average HH
income, $1000
0.0007 0.0017
(2.79) (9.93)
Gini coef.
−0.1152 0.0381
(−1.39) (0.51)
R2 0.3996 0.7045
Number of obs. 50 50
1) t-statistics are given in parentheses.
2) Other controls for the data regression include average household
size, fraction of population employed in the non-farm sector, and
an indicator for the state having at least one city with population
over a million. Both regressions also include a constant.
1.7 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to study the relationship between the
consumer’s income and his vehicle ownership decisions, and to analyze the im-
plications of these decisions for the moments of the vehicle age distribution by
aggregating over consumers with different income levels. For these purposes,
a dynamic, discreet-choice, heterogeneous agents model of vehicle ownership
was constructed. The agents in the model can choose to own up to one ve-
hicle at a time. The vehicles are differentiated by age, and the utility from
vehicle ownership is assumed to be decreasing in age. The agent’s choice of a
particular vintage depends on his income and the prices of vehicles. The price
of a new vehicle is assumed to be exogenous, while the prices of used vehicles
decline with age at an endogenous rate.
The model predicts that higher-income agents are more likely to own
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a vehicle, and that among vehicle-owners, the age of the vehicle held is a de-
creasing function of income. These outcomes are consistent with the empirical
evidence on vehicle ownership patterns obtained from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey. At the aggregate level, the estimated model, with incomes of
different agent types calibrated to match the income distribution for the US
in 2001, does a good job replicating the distribution of vehicle vintages in the
US for the same year.
The model was used to analyze the effects of changes in the underlying
distribution of consumer incomes on the aggregate vehicle ownership statistics,
such as the number of vehicles per capita, the per-capita sales of new vehicles,
and the mean and median ages of the vehicle stock.
The model predicts that economies with the same level of income in-
equality, but higher mean per-capita incomes, are characterized by larger ve-
hicle stocks and higher sales of new vehicles. The mean and median ages of
the vehicle stock may be higher or lower, however, depending on the endoge-
nous vehicle-ownership rates. If two economies have large fractions of vehicle
owners, the economy with higher average income has a younger vehicle stock,
since higher-income vehicle owners hold newer vehicles. In poorer economies
with low ownership rates, the economy with higher mean per-capita income
may have an older vehicle stock, since a larger fraction of its lower-income
consumers have enough income to own a vehicle, but only an older one. Miller
et al. [15] report a strong negative relationship between per-capita incomes
and median ages of vehicles for counties in Tennessee. Since these counties are
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characterized by high rates of vehicle ownership, the model would generate a
relationship of the same sign as the one observed in the data.
The model predicts that for a given level of mean per-capita income,
higher levels of income inequality lead to older vehicle stocks. The vehicle
ownership rates are lower in more unequal economies, while the relationship
between new vehicle sales and the level of income inequality is non-monotone.
The empirical relationship between income inequality and moments of the
vehicle age distribution are harder to establish due to the unavailability of
data. For the US, the data on income inequality at the state or the MSA levels
are available from the US Census Bureau. However, the data on the vehicle
age distribution at those levels of disaggregation are not publicly available.
The data on the total vehicle registrations and the sales of new vehi-
cles at the state level are publicly available, however, so the predictions of
the model for these variables can be tested. The analysis indicates that at
high levels of income and vehicle ownership, the differences in the per capita
vehicle registrations across regions cannot be explained by the differences in
income distributions. The model produces very little variation in the number
of vehicles per capita, with the majority of the states having one vehicle for
every person over the age of sixteen.
The per-capita sales of new vehicles are increasing in mean household
income and do not depend on the level of income inequality in both model
and data. The latter finding is consistent with the model’s prediction for the
given range of the Gini coefficient values. The model can explain most of the
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variation in the new vehicle registrations per capita across states.
Overall, this chapter makes an important step in studying the relation-
ships between consumer incomes and the ages of durable goods consumed, at
both the individual and the aggregate levels.
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Chapter 2
Can Increases in Real Consumer Incomes
Explain the Aging of Motor Vehicles in the
US?
The average age of motor vehicles in the US has increased by over 40
percent since the mid-1960s. A similar trend is observed for the median age
of vehicles, which has increased by 39 percent from 1967 to 2001. Both of
these trends are depicted in Figure 2.1 below. The aging of the vehicle stock
has occurred at the same time as the rapid increase in vehicle ownership, from
0.67 vehicles per person of driving age in 1967 to more than one vehicle per
person almost forty years later (Figure 2.2a). As the data on new vehicle
registrations show, this increase has not been the outcome of higher rates of
purchase for new vehicles, but the result of the difference between registrations
of new vehicles and scrappage of the previously owned ones. Thus, over this
time period, both the total number of vehicles and the fraction of used vehicles
have increased, producing the observed trend of aging for the vehicle stock.
Motor vehicles are the largest component of consumer durables, so un-
derstanding what factors determine the ages of the goods consumed, and how
changes in these factors affect this aspect of consumption is an important eco-
nomic undertaking. Another reason to study the causes of aging of motor
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Figure 2.1: Mean and median ages of vehicles in the US
Source: Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures [16] and
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [24]
vehicles in the US is that it has a negative impact on the environment, since
older vehicle stocks are associated with higher levels of emissions.1
This chapter analyzes the effect of demand factors on vehicle ownership
decisions. It asks whether increases in real consumer incomes can explain some
of the aging of vehicles, through their effect on these decisions. The hypothesis
is that income growth has enabled lower-income consumers to become vehicle
owners for the first time via purchases of used, older vehicles. Their choices
1The US Environmental Protection Agency uses a computer model MOBILE that cor-
relates emission toxicity directly with ages of vehicles to guide its policy decisions.
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Figure 2.2: Number of vehicles per capita, using civilian
noninstitutional population over 16 years of
age
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [24]
have lead to both the growth of the vehicle stock and the increase in the
average age of vehicles.
Figure 2.3 shows that vehicle ownership rates have increased over the
past forty years, with most of the increase occurring among households in
the lower income quintiles. These households are less likely to own a vehicle;
when they do, their vehicles tend to be older on average. Table 2.1 presents
summary statistics to illustrate these differences in consumption of vehicles.
Lower-income households tend to own older vehicles, both because they are
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more likely to buy them used and because they hold on to them longer.2
Figure 2.3: Percentage of households that own or lease
one or more vehicles by income quintiles
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey [6]
To evaluate the effect of changes in consumer incomes and prices of
vehicles on vehicle ownership decisions, I use a dynamic, non-stationary, het-
erogeneous agents model, with consumer incomes and prices of new vehicles
growing over time at the rates observed in the data. Figure 2.4 shows that
the prices of new vehicles have been declining relative to the mean incomes
of households.3 The consumers in the model are allowed to own up to one
2The statistics on the number of years a vehicle is held is presented only for vehicles
that were new at the time of purchase. In general the number of years a vehicle is owned
depends on vehicle’s age, so this subset of vehicles was chosen in order to control for the
effect of age.
3Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [24] publishes average expenditure per new car and an
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Table 2.1: Vehicle ownership by income quintiles
Income
group:
Quintiles
Fraction of
HHs that own
or lease at least
1 vehicle
Age of vehicles
owned or
leased
Fraction
new,
1979-
2001
Years held
(new
only),
1979-20011979-
2001
1979 2001
1979-
2001
1979 2001
Quint. 1
(low)
0.64 0.60 0.70 10.02 8.20 10.46 0.32 7.28
Quint. 2 0.88 0.85 0.88 8.88 7.25 9.55 0.36 5.95
Quint. 3 0.94 0.93 0.95 8.18 7.06 8.74 0.41 5.38
Quint. 4 0.96 0.96 0.97 7.60 6.42 7.74 0.46 5.03
Quint. 5
(high)
0.97 0.98 0.97 6.67 5.87 6.55 0.58 4.79
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey [6]
vehicle at a time, and can trade both new and used vehicles. The vehicles are
differentiated by quality which depends on vehicle’s age via the assumption
that older vehicles are more likely to be of poorer quality. The prices of used
vehicles depend on their quality level and are allowed to change over time at
endogenous rates.
The estimated model is able to replicate both the increase in vehicle
ownership and the stationarity of new vehicle registrations over the 1967-2001
period. It predicts a significant increase in the average age of vehicles (39.3%)
over this time period due to the entry of lower-income consumers into vehicle
ownership and their decisions to own older vehicles. Thus, this simple model
estimated average new car price for a 1967 ”comparable car”. The data on mean incomes
are from the Historical Income Tables compiled from the Annual Demographic Supplements
to the Current Population Survey.
40
Figure 2.4: Price of new car and average expenditure
per new car relative to mean household in-
come
Sources: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [24] and the
US Census Bureau
demonstrates that demand factors have a strong influence on vehicle ownership
decisions, including the ages of vehicles held, and changes in these factors have
contributed to the overall trend of aging and increased longevity of the vehicle
stock in the US over the 1967-2001 period.
Hamilton and Macauley [11] make the first attempt at understanding
the causes of increased longevity and aging of vehicles in the US. The authors
ask whether improvements in durability could account for increased longevity
of cars. The reduced form analysis on the automobile death rates leads them to
conclude that increased longevity of cars has nothing to do with improvements
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in durability, and is due entirely to changes in some external factors. They
hypothesize that these factors may include declining maintenance costs, lower
accident rates, improved roads, or any other forces that cause consumers to
take better care of their cars and maintain them into older age. While changes
in these factors could have potentially contributed to the aging of vehicles, as
well as to some of the increase in vehicle ownership, they would not be able
to account for non-declining sales of new vehicles and the increase in vehicle
ownership as dramatic as the one observed in the data.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 de-
scribes the model and Section 2.2 discusses the solution algorithm. Section 2.3
describes the estimation procedure. The results are presented in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 concludes with summary and possible extensions. Appendix A con-
tains a detailed description of the data, and Appendix B presents additional
motivating evidence.
2.1 Model
The economy is populated with a finite number of infinitely lived agents
j = 1, ..., N , heterogeneous in incomes. In every period t agent j is endowed
with income yjt , with y
1
t < y
2
t < ... < y
N
t ∀t. The natural logarithm of
agent j’s income grows every period at a constant rate gjy, that is, ln
(
yjt+1
)
=(
1 + gjy
)
ln
(
yjt
)
, j = 1, ..., N .
In every period the agents decide on their consumption of non-durable
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and durable goods. The durable goods are vehicles heterogeneous in quality.4
Let q ∈ {H,M,L,N} be the vehicle’s quality level, where q = H if vehicle’s
quality is high, q = M if it is medium, q = L if it is low, and q = N if no
vehicle is owned. In every period t, the vehicles of all quality levels can be
traded at respective prices pt(H), pt(M), and pt(L). The outside option of not
owning a vehicle is available to the agent at price pt(N) = 0 ∀t.
Agent j in period t derives utility from consuming non-durable goods
cjt and vehicle qualities q
j
t according to the following utility function:
U
(
qjt , c
j
t
)
= v
(
qjt
)
+ u
(
cjt
)
, (2.1)
where
v
(
qjt
)
=

1, if qjt = H
η, if qjt =M
η2, if qjt = L
0, if qjt = N
and u
(
cjt
)
=
(
cjt
λ
)1−γ
1− γ .
The utility from vehicle ownership is increasing in vehicle’s quality due
to the assumption of η < 1. The utility from the consumption of nondurables
has a CRRA form with a scale factor λ.
Agent j arrives in period t with a vehicle of quality q.5 In the beginning
of the period, he chooses the vehicle’s quality to consume in the current period,
4The quality of the vehicle depends on its age; however, the vehicle’s age does not enter
the decision problem directly.
5The indices j and t on vehicle’s qualities are suppressed to simplify exposition.
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q˜. The option of keeping a vehicle is equivalent to choosing q˜ = q. Prior to
entering period t+1, the agent realizes a random shock to vehicle’s quality. The
distribution of the shock depends on current quality level q˜, and its realized
value q′ is the quality of the vehicle in the beginning of next period, t + 1.
Formally, in every period t agent j solves:
V jt (q) = max
q˜=H,M,L,N
{
v (q˜) + u
(
yjt + pt (q)− pt (q˜)
)
+ β Eq′/q˜V
j
t+1 (q
′)
}
, (2.2)
The transition probability matrix from today’s quality level q˜ to tomor-
row’s q′ is
Π (q˜, q′) =

piHH 1− piHH 0 0
0 piMM 1− piMM 0
0 0 piLL 1− piLL
0 0 0 1
 . (2.3)
It is assumed that vehicle’s quality cannot improve as a result of the
shock or go down more than one step on the quality ladder in a single period.
These assumptions are made in order to have a straightforward mapping be-
tween vehicle’s quality and age. As a vehicle ages, its quality stochastically
deteriorates from high to low, until it is destroyed. Note that Π (q˜, q′) is not
indexed by time, reflecting the assumption of constant physical durability.
Agent’s decisions in period t are affected by current and future prices of
vehicle qualities {pτ (H), pτ (M), pτ (L)}τ=t,...,∞. Assume that a high quality
vehicle can only be purchased new, therefore, its price pt(H) is the price of a
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new vehicle. The new vehicle’s price pt(H) in every period is exogenous.
6 The
natural logarithm of pt (H) is assumed to grow at a constant rate gp, so that
ln (pt+1 (H)) = (1 + gp) ln (pt (H)) ∀t.
A non-stationary equilibrium for a series of new vehicle prices is a col-
lection of type-specific value and policy functions, and prices of used vehicles,
such that individuals optimize and markets for vehicle qualities M and L
clear in every period t = 0, ...,∞. Solving for the equilibrium involves finding
market-clearing prices {pt (M) , pt (L)}t=0,...,∞ . This is a very difficult task due
to its high dimensionality and feedbacks between qualities and time periods.
To reduce dimensionality of the problem, assume that pt (M) = α
M
t pt (H) and
pt (L) = α
L
t pt (M) with α
M
t , α
L
t ∈ [0, 1] in every period t. The parameters
αMt and α
L
t are allowed to grow or decline over time at respective rates gM and
gL, so that α
M
t+1 = (1 + gM)α
M
t and α
L
t+1 = (1 + gL)α
L
t .
7 The initial values
αM0 and α
L
0 and growth rates gM and gL are estimated within the model with
a moment condition that supply equals demand at given prices across quali-
ties and time. Thus, instead of estimating potentially thousands of individual
prices, the problem is reduced to finding the values for four parameters. The
6Adda and Cooper ([1] and [2]) study household demand for cars using a dynamic sta-
tionary discrete choice model. They make the same assumption about the production side
of the market for new cars. The supply of new vehicles is characterized by a constant returns
to scale production function. Together with the assumption of constant mark-ups, this im-
plies that the price of a new vehicle is independent of the demand for new vehicles. This
assumption of the exogenous new vehicle’s price greatly simplifies the analysis. However, it
may be too strong, since the time-series analysis shows that moments of the distribution of
vehicle vintages significantly predict future prices of new vehicles.
7The restriction αMt , α
L
t ∈ [0, 1] ∀t means that actually αMt+1 =
max
{
min
{
(1 + gM )αMt , 1
}
, 0
}
and αLt+1 = max
{
min
{
(1 + gL)αLt , 1
}
, 0
}
.
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cost of this approach is that the prices and the decision rules obtained with it
are not the equilibrium solutions, but their approximations.
The model makes strong assumptions on the processes for consumer
incomes and new vehicle prices. Even though incomes have on average been
growing faster than prices over the past forty years, there is no reason to
believe that this trend should continue indefinitely into the future. The best
way to deal with this issue would be to have a model of supply for new vehicles.
However, given the imperfectly competitive structure of the industry and the
dynamic nature of the model’s environment, this is a very complicated task
that is beyond the scope of this project.8 Short of endogenizing the price of
new vehicles, would be imposing a time period on the model after which prices
and incomes grow at the same rate. This would require making an assumption
on when this growth rate equality would occur.
The model also assumes that consumers cannot borrow to finance a
purchase of a vehicle. Relaxing this assumption may facilitate the entry of
lower-income agents into vehicle ownership. This would substantially increase
the computational complexity of the model. However, its qualitative implica-
tions should remain unaltered, since in any given time period ownership rates
would be a declining function of income, and among vehicle owners consumers
with lower incomes would hold lower quality, older vehicles. Similarly, relaxing
the assumptions of deterministic processes for incomes and prices of vehicles,
8See Shum and Esteban [7] for a dynamic oligopoly model of the automobile industry.
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and no transitions between income groups, would affect the quantitative, but
not the qualitative implications of the model.
2.2 Solving the Model
2.2.1 Agent’s Decision Problem
The model is non-stationary with several growth rates
{
gjy
}
j=1,..,N
, gp,
gM , and gL, where g
j
y is the growth rate for income of agent j, gp is the growth
rate for the price of a new vehicle pt (H), and gM and gL are those of price
depreciation parameters αMt and α
L
t for prices of used vehicle qualities M and
L respectively. The non-stationarity of the model does not allow it to be solved
using the value function iteration method, because the value function changes
over time. The solution can still be obtained, though, because for every type
of agent there exists a future time period after which his decision is trivial. If
the agent’s income grows faster than the price of a new vehicle (gjy > gp), he
will eventually be wealthy enough to only hold a high quality vehicle in every
period. That is, after some period T (j), for any initial state q ∈ {H,M,L,N}
the agent will choose q˜ = H. Therefore, for agents with gjy > gp, the solution
algorithm consists of finding period T (j) and solving for the agent’s optimal
quality choices backwards from this period to period zero.
For agents with gjy < gp, there also will be a time period in the future
after which the decision is trivial. This decision depends on prices of other
vehicle qualities, described by parameters αMt and α
L
t , and their respective
growth rates gM and gL. An agent whose income grows slower than the price of
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a new, high quality vehicle eventually will not be able to afford such a vehicle.
However, he may purchase a vehicle of different quality level depending on its
price. If gM , gL ≥ 0, vehicles of all qualities are getting less affordable, and the
agent will eventually choose to exit the market. If the price of a medium quality
vehicle grows slower than the agent’s income, that is, gM < 0, eventually both
medium and low quality vehicles will be available at zero prices, and consumers
with gjy < gp will be purchasing medium quality vehicles. Finally, if gM ≥ 0
and gL < 0, eventually the agent will not be able to afford either high or
medium quality vehicles, and will be holding low quality vehicles in every
period. Therefore, for any values of gM and gL there will be a time period
T (j) after which agent’s decision is trivial, and the optimal vehicle quality
holdings can be solved for by backwards induction.
Using the method outline above, the policy functions from t = 0 to
t = T (j) are obtained for every agent type j = 1, ..., N . The Q series of shocks
to quality are generated for every type of agent, and the policy functions are
used to find optimal choices in every period and map them to vehicle ownership
decisions and vehicle ages held, if any.
2.2.2 From Qualities to Ages
Agent’s decisions are based on vehicle’s quality. To infer vehicle’s age
from these decisions, two pieces of information are required: the age of the
vehicle at the time of purchase, and the number of periods it has been held by
the agent. Since a period in the model is equal to one year, the knowledge of
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these two factors is sufficient.
Every vehicle starts its life at the age of zero at the high quality level.
Over its lifetime, it receives annual shocks to quality that may lead to its
depreciation, until it is destroyed or there is no longer an agent that is willing
to hold it at its current quality level and price. The shocks to quality are drawn
from the distribution functions given in rows of matrix Π (q˜, q′) (2.3). The
choice of matrix Π (q˜, q′) implies that, on average, a high quality vehicle will
transition to medium quality after a certain number of years, which depends
on the value of piHH . Similarly, the number of years it takes for a typical
medium quality vehicle to transition to low quality will depend on the value
of piMM , and piLL determines the physical life expectancy of a vehicle.
The values for piHH and piMM have been chosen so that, on average,
a high quality vehicle becomes a medium quality one after three years, and
a medium quality vehicle transitions to low quality after an additional six
years. The choice of the threshold values is guided by Stolyarov’s [21] study
on the resale rates of used automobiles. He finds that the resale rates are
non-monotonic in age, with two spikes at approximately four and ten years of
age. To find piLL, I assume that it takes, on average, another eleven years for
a vehicle to be destroyed, so that the physical life expectancy of a vehicle is
twenty years of age.9
9The assumption of piLL < 1 is made so that low income agents may not own a lower
quality vehicle indefinitely, without any loss to utility from vehicle ownership occurring over
time. Higher values of piLL make it easier to produce the result that the average age of
vehicles rises as poorer agents become vehicle owners, since they would be less likely to
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For simplicity, I assume throughout the model that every agent de-
manding a vehicle of particular quality gets one. If this quality is not supplied,
the agent will receive a four year old vehicle if he demands a medium quality
vehicle, and a ten year old vehicle if a low quality one is his optimal choice.10
This is especially true in period t = 0, since by assumption every agent begins
his life with no vehicle, so there is no supply of used vehicles. In all subsequent
periods, however, demanders are matched with suppliers whenever possible.
If markets for used vehicles clear in every period after the initial one,
every vehicle in the model can be traced from the beginning of its life to its
end, as it changes owners according to the supply and demand decisions of
agents. The age of each of the vehicles in every period can be easily obtained,
and the vehicle age distribution computed. However, given that the market
clearing conditions for used vehicles do not hold exactly in many of the pe-
riods, there will be time periods with excess supply or demand for particular
vehicle quality. Thus, there will be used vehicles that disappear into nowhere
or appear from nowhere. This is an unfortunate consequence of the model’s
simplifying assumption on the prices of used vehicles, and the goal is to min-
imize the discrepancies between supply and demand, making the fraction of
replace their vehicles. The choice of twenty as the average age of destruction seems like a
reasonable compromise.
It is important to emphasize that the transition probabilities are not time-dependent,
and thus vehicle’s durability characteristics remain constant over time. Even though the
physical life expectancy is constant, the economic one is not, since it depends on agents’
decisions.
10If a used vehicle of these qualities is not supplied domestically, suppose he orders one
from Europe or Asia.
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such vehicles as small as possible.
2.3 Estimation
Solving the model requires the assignment of particular values to its
parameters. Parameters describing preferences and prices of used vehicles{
η, γ, λ, αM0 , α
L
0 , gM , gL
}
are estimated within the model via a combination
of simulated method of moments and nonlinear least squares approaches. The
incomes of agents and the price of a new vehicle in 1967, as well as their
growth rates,
{{
yj1967, g
j
y
}
j=1,...,N
, p1967 (H) , gp
}
, are estimated outside the
model. The number of agent types N = 100 and the number of generated
series for the shocks to quality for ever type of agent Q = 100 are chosen so
as to optimize on the computational time, while still resulting in meaningful
predictions from the model. The annual discount rate β = 0.96 is chosen so
as to match previous studies.
An additional piece of information is required in order for the model
to be solved, and that is the distribution of vehicle vintages among agents’
types in the first year of interest, 1967. Since there is no data available to
estimate it, the procedure steps back an additional 20 years to the year 1947,
and assumes it to be the model’s initial time period.11 In this initial period,
the agents of every type j start out without a vehicle, and make decisions from
that period forward on whether to own a vehicle and if so, of what quality.
11Number 20 was picked since it is the physical life expectancy of a vehicle, and the effect
of the initial age distribution, if any, would ”wear off” by the year 1967.
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This way, the agents’ preferences and changes in incomes and prices determine
optimal vintage holdings in the first year of interest from the data, 1967.
Below I describe the estimation procedure and data used to estimate
specific parameters of the model. A more detailed description of the data is
provided in Appendix A.
2.3.1 Parameters estimated outside the model
The initial incomes of agents
{
yj1967
}
j=1,...,N
and their growth rates{
gjy
}
j=1,...,N
are estimated using the data on mean household income and the
measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient, from the Annual Demo-
graphic Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The income
distribution was approximated with a lognormal pdf, with its parameters es-
timated so as to match the mean household income and the Gini coefficient
in every year from 1967 to 2005. Then, the mean incomes for each of the 100
percentiles were computed using the estimated lognormal density function.
Household size tends to vary among different income groups, with households
in lower income percentiles on average having fewer people. To take this into
account, the mean incomes of households were computed in per capita terms.
The average number of people per household over the age of 16 was obtained
from the CPS, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey [6] was used to obtain
the ratios between household sizes in different income percentiles.12 Using
12This ratio is stationary over the twenty year period in the Consumer Expenditure Survey
[6], even though the average household size is declining.
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these data, the estimates for the mean incomes per person over the age of
16 were obtained for each of the income percentiles. These estimates were
deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. The
growth rates
{
gjy
}
j=1,...,N
for the natural logarithm of mean household income
per person 16 years old and older in every percentile were estimated using thus
generated data for the 1967-2005 period.
The estimates for the average price of a new vehicle in 1967, p1967 (H),
and the growth rate of its natural logarithm, gp, were obtained using the data
on the average expenditure per new car published in the Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook [24] for the years 1967-2005. Prior to the estimation, the price data
were also adjusted by the PCE.
The estimated growth rate for the price gp = 0.001. The income growth
rates
{
gjy
}
j=1,...,N
monotonly increase from percentile 1 to 100. This corre-
sponds to the observed increases in income inequality. The incomes of agents
in percentiles j = 1, ..., 8 grow slower than the price of a new vehicle, that
is, gjy < gp. Wealthier percentiles grow at higher rates with g
j
y > gp for
j = 9, ..., 100.
2.3.2 Parameters estimated within the model
The preference parameters η, γ, and λ, the initial price depreciation
parameters αM0 and α
L
0 , and their respective growth rates gM and gL are
estimated using a combination of simulated method of moments and nonlinear
least squares approaches. The data used in the estimation are the total number
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of vehicles per capita, the new vehicle registrations per capita, and the mean
ages of vehicles. The data on registered vehicles in the US were compiled from
the Ward Automotive Yearbook [24]. The per capita numbers were obtained
by dividing the aggregate number of vehicles and the new vehicle registrations
by the civilian noninstitutional population over sixteen years of age acquired
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The parameter values were chosen so as to minimize the distance be-
tween the observed data and the predictions from the model in the least squares
sense. The minimized criterion is a weighted sum of three components: 1) the
average distance between actual and simulated new vehicle registrations per
capita over the 1967-2001 period, 2) the average distance between actual and
predicted total number of vehicles registered per capita over the same time
period, and 3) the difference between the average age of vehicles in the model
and data in 1967. Each of the component criteria was weighted by the empir-
ical inverse of the moment’s variance from the trend. Note that the procedure
aims to match the average age of vehicles only in 1967. The model seeks to
explain the increase in the average age of vehicles over the 1967-2001 period, so
the choice of the whole path as a moment would strongly bias the estimation
procedure towards producing the desired result.
The model’s predictions for the number of new vehicle registrations per
capita are affected by the realizations of shocks to quality. Thus, minimizing
the distance between the observed data and the average predicted variable
would produce inconsistent estimates for a fixed number of simulations Q. The
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nonlinear least square objective function was corrected for this inconsistency
bias using the method introduced in Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong [13]. They
propose a modification of the criterion that includes a second-order correction
term for the bias; with Q = 100 the value of this term is negligible.
The moments for the market clearing conditions across vehicle qualities
and time were also added to the criterion. The prices of used vehicle qualities
pt (M) and pt (L) in every period t can be obtained for any given values
of
{
αM0 , α
L
0 , gM , gL
}
. These parameters are chosen so as to minimize the
average distance between supply and demand for each quality in every period.
The final criterion was minimized via the simplex algorithm due to
Nelder and Mead [17].
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Estimated Parameters and Moment Values
Table 2.2 presents the estimated parameter values, and Figure 2.5 plots
two data series used in the estimation, the total number of vehicles per capita
and the new vehicle registrations per capita, both over the 1967-2001 period.
Overall, predictions generated by the model are close to the data, with agents
in the model entering the market for vehicles and purchasing new vehicles at
rates similar to those observed in the real world. Also, the average age of
vehicles in 1967 generated by the model is 5.9989, versus 6.0 in the data.
The model slightly under predicts the total number of vehicles per
capita at the end of the sample period. The low rates of income growth in the
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bottom three income percentiles are not sufficient to induce their entry prior
to 2001 even with declining prices of low quality vehicles. For the new vehicle
registrations per capita, the series generated by the model is not as volatile as
the one from the data. The model does not have any income or price shocks;
the only source of volatility for the predicted new vehicle registrations series
is shocks to quality. Overall, the model is capable of generating both the
non-stationary number of vehicles per capita and the stationary new vehicle
registrations per capita patterns observed in the data.
Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
λ 15, 501 5.8903
γ 2.8125 6.8859e− 004
η 0.6042 1.9590e− 004
αM0 0.8021 2.4097e− 004
gM −0.0248 8.0812e− 006
αL0 0.6480 1.7249e− 004
gL −0.0199 1.0617e− 005
Note: Standard errors are computed from 100 Monte
Carlo replications.
With prices of new vehicles growing at a rate lower than the average rate
of income growth, high quality vehicles are becoming relatively more affordable
to increasingly larger fraction of the population, leading to greater potential
supply of medium as well as lower quality vehicles. The model implies that the
prices of used vehicles should decline over time, that is, gM < 0. In the limit,
as t → ∞, pt (M) → 0 and pt (L) → 0. If that was not the case and gM > 0,
eventually medium quality vehicles would cost as much as the new, high quality
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Figure 2.5: Total number of vehicles per capita and new
vehicle registrations per capita: model ver-
sus data
ones. If gM = 0 and α
M
0 > 0, the price of a medium quality vehicle grows
at rate gp. Thus, for any gM ≥ 0, the bottom eight income percentiles with
gjy < gp would eventually not be able to afford medium quality vehicles. At the
same time, income percentiles nine through one hundred would be demanding
high quality vehicles and supplying medium quality ones at positive prices.
However, the demand for medium quality vehicles would be equal to zero,
and the market clearing condition would not hold. If gM < 0, income types
nine through one hundred would eventually be buying high quality vehicles,
and would be indifferent between selling and scrapping their vehicles once the
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transition to medium quality has occurred. Agent types one through eight
would be purchasing medium quality vehicles at zero prices, and the extra
medium quality vehicles supplied would get scrapped. The market for low
quality vehicles would disappear entirely.
The estimates for the parameters describing the prices of medium and
high quality vehicles and their evolution over time
{
αM0 , α
L
0 , gM , gL
}
are
presented in Table 2.2. At these parameter values the average fraction of the
total vehicle stock that is either in excess demand of supply is equal to 0.0555.
This means that on average around 5.6% of the total vehicle stock appear from
nowhere and/or vanish in every period.13 The estimation procedure aims to
bring this fraction as close to zero as possible, so this is a measure of closeness
to the equilibrium. The actual criterion used is the squared distance between
per capita supply and demand, averaged over time periods and used vehicle
qualities. The value of the criterion at the estimated values for the parameters
is 9.5789e− 004.
2.4.2 Average Age of Vehicles, 1967-2001
Figure 2.6 plots the average ages of vehicles over the 1967 – 2001 pe-
riod from model and data. The model predicts a substantial increase in the
average age of vehicles due to the entry of lower income consumers into vehicle
ownership. The predicted average age increases from 5.9989 in 1967 to 8.3567
13Thus, the undesirable feature of the model is that it generates imports and exports of
used vehicles.
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in 2001, a 39.3 percent increase in the model versus the 43.3 percent increase
in the data.
The shape of the predicted average age increase, however, does not
match the one from the data. The model implies that eventually, as incomes
grow relative to prices of vehicles, the majority of consumers will be holding
high quality vehicles, with the rest owning medium quality ones. In the limit,
the average age of vehicles will be low at 3.48.14 Thus, initial aging of the
vehicle stock will be followed by future decline in the average age, as income
growth causes increasingly larger fraction of consumers to choose younger and
better quality vehicles. The predicted average age sequence, therefore, is of
the inverse U- shape. The model also does not have any shocks to aggregate
income or prices of vehicles, so any generated sequence for the average age
would be characterized by a steady increase, followed by a steady decline.
This chapter asks whether some of the increase in the average age of
vehicles in the US over the 1967-2001 period could have been due to the in-
creases in consumer incomes and the ensuing entry of lower-income consumers
into vehicle ownership. The estimated model produces a positive answer to
this question. Even though it predicts that eventually the vehicle stock will
be getting younger and the used vehicle market will be very small, over the
time period in question the market for used vehicles is growing and the vehicle
14It is on average 3 for the top 9 through 100 income groups, and 9 for the bottom 1
through 8 ones.
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Figure 2.6: Average age of vehicles: model versus data
stock is aging.15 The satiation begins to occur around the year 1993, after
which the average age starts to decline.
The agents in the model have two means for improving their well-being
in response to growth in incomes, depending on their vehicle ownership status.
Non-vehicle owners can use additional income to acquire their first vehicle.
Vehicle owners can purchase a higher quality, newer vehicle. The decline in the
average age begins to occur when most of the consumers have become vehicle
owners, and as such can only respond to further increases in income by choosing
to hold higher quality, younger vehicles. There are two assumptions that bias
the model towards this intensive margin: unit demands and single vehicle
15The model predicts that the average age of vehicles will fall below the 1967 level of 6.0
around the year 2078.
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type. Introducing another type of a vehicle, a luxury one with a higher value
of parameter η, would weaken this intensive margin. Another option is to allow
the agents to own more than one vehicle. Appendix B presents some evidence
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey that relaxing the assumption of unit
demands may be important. At the household level, vehicles of different ages
appear to be substitutes, as households with more vehicles tend to purchase
a larger fraction of them used and hold on to each of their vehicles longer.
As the result, the average age of vehicles is higher in households with larger
vehicle stocks. We also observe an increase in the average number of vehicles
owned by households over time.16 With these assumptions relaxed, the model
would imply a more prolonged increase in the average age of the vehicle stock.
This is an interesting extension of the model that is left for future research.
2.4.3 Additional moments
To evaluate the fit of the model, consider two additional statistics calcu-
lated from both model and data in Figure 2.7. The data on the average number
of years a vehicle is held come from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1980-
2002. The data on the median ages of vehicles are from Ward Automotive
Yearbook. The predictions from the model appear to be in approximately the
same range. The model begins to under predict both the average number of
years a vehicle is owned and the median age of vehicles starting around 1993,
16Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey shows a steady increase in the average
number of vehicles per person over the age of 16 in household that own or lease at least one
vehicle, from 0.94 in 1979 to 1.06 in 2001.
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the same year the average age of vehicles in the model also begins to decline.
Figure 2.7: Average number of years owned and median
age: model and data
Next subsection analyzes agents’ behavior to see what decisions gener-
ate the results presented above.
2.4.4 Agents’ Decisions
Agents in the model decide in every period whether to own a vehicle,
and if so, of what quality. These decisions evolve over time in response to
changes in income and prices of vehicles. All of the agent types can be sorted
into several groups according to how these decisions on ownership and vehicle
quality change over time. Every agent in the estimated model falls into one of
the following seven groups:
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1. No vehicle is owned over the whole sample period;
2. The agent does not own a vehicle at first, and owns a low quality vehicle
by the end of the sample period;
3. The agent does not own a vehicle in the beginning of the sample period,
and transitions to a medium quality vehicle by the end of the period;
4. The quality of the agent’s vehicle stock increases from low to medium
over the sample period;
5. The agent owns a medium quality vehicle over the whole sample period;
6. The agent starts out with a medium quality vehicle and updates its
quality to the high level at some point prior to the end of the period;
7. A high quality vehicle is always held.
Figure 2.8 illustrates these categories and sorts the agents accordingly.
Note that the groups are ordered by income, from lowest to highest,
and vehicle ownership and vehicle quality consumption are strictly increasing
in income. Consumption of vehicle ages, however, is not strictly monotone in
income. To illustrate, suppose that agent A has a slightly lower income than
agent B. As the result of the income difference, agent B chooses to become a
vehicle owner via a purchase of a low quality vehicle one period before agent
A does. If both agents purchase a low quality vehicle of an average selling
age for these vehicles, which is 10, and the vehicle of agent B survives to the
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next period, then agent B owns an 11 year old vehicle at the same time as
lower-income agent A owns a 10 year old one.
Figure 2.8: Agent types according to vehicle ownership
and quality decisions
Figure 2.10 illustrates the average ages held by agents in different
groups via pairwise comparisons. Agents in Group 1 do not own a vehicle
over the whole sample period, so Figure 2.10a shows only the average ages of
vehicles owned by agents in Group 2. The stock of vehicles held by the agents
in this group experiences a steady increase in the average age over the sample
period. The agents in Group 3 are wealthier than the ones in Group 2. How-
ever, Figure 2.10b shows that for the first half of the sample period they own
on average older vehicles. This is due to them entering into vehicle ownership
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Figure 2.9: Fraction of vehicle owners in Groups 2 and 3
sooner, and thus holding their vehicles for several periods prior to the entry of
their lower-income counterparts, similar to the example above with agents A
and B. The agents in Group 3 eventually switch to holding medium quality,
younger vehicles, so the average age of their vehicle stock begins to decline.
Figure 2.10c shows that the agents in Group 4 transition to the ownership
of medium quality vehicles sooner than most of the agents in Group 3, thus,
on average, their vehicles are younger than those held by the lower-income
types. Agents in Group 5 own medium quality vehicles over the whole sample
period. Figure 2.10d shows that their vehicles tend to be younger than those
held by the agents in Group 4 over the first half of the sample period. The
relationship changes as more agents from Group 4 become owners of medium
quality vehicles for the first time. Figure 2.10d depicts the average ages of
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vehicles held by Groups 5 and 6, and shows that as agents in Group 6 switch
to the ownership of high quality vehicles, their vehicle stock becomes younger.
Finally, in Figure 2.10f agents from Group 7 always hold the youngest vehicles
on average.
Figure 2.10: Average ages of vehicles by ownership and
quality decision groups
The relationship between incomes and the ages of vehicles owned is not
strictly monotone, however, as Figure 2.11 illustrates, the model still produces
an overall pattern of inverse relationship between vehicle ages and incomes.
The model generates three distinct groups of agents with large differences in
the mean ages of vehicles held, which is due to the assumption of only three
age-dependent quality levels for vehicles, high, medium, and low. Similar
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pictures can be generated for other years in the sample period.
Figure 2.11: Average ages of vehicles owned by income
percentiles, 2001
The overall increase in the average age of vehicles predicted by the
model is mostly due to the decisions of agents in Groups 2 and 3. As these
agents choose to become vehicle owners for the first time with low quality,
older vehicles, the mass of the age distribution shifts towards older vintages.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the entry rates of agents in these two groups. Eventually,
the model predicts a decline in the average age of the vehicle stock as agents
respond to income increases by updating the quality of their vehicle. The
average ages of vehicles held by agents in Groups 3, 4, 5, and 6 experience this
decline over the sample period.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter developed a dynamic, non-stationary, discrete choice, het-
erogeneous agents model, to study the increased vehicle ownership among
lower-income consumers and its effect on aggregate demand for vehicle vin-
tages. The agents have different incomes, and their incomes grow over time at
the rates calibrated from the data. They can choose to own up to one vehicle
at a time, and can trade both new and used vehicles. The vehicles are differ-
entiated by age-dependent quality, with the assumption that older vehicles are
more likely to be of poorer quality. The price of a new, high quality vehicle is
exogenous, and its growth rate is estimated from the data. The prices of used
vehicles depend on their quality level and are allowed to change over time at
endogenous rates.
The model is able to replicate both the increase in per capita vehicle
ownership over the 1967-2001 period, as well as the stationarity of the per
capita new vehicle registrations series. It predicts a significant increase in
the average age of vehicles over this time period, due to the entry of lower-
income consumers into vehicle ownership via the purchase of low quality, older
vehicles.
The model restricts the agents to owning at most one vehicle. Evidence
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey indicates that vehicles of different
vintages are substitutes at the household level. Households with more vehicles
tend to purchase a larger fraction of them used and hold on to each of their
vehicles longer, so their vehicle stocks tend to be older. The data also show
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an increase in the number of vehicles per household over the time period of
interest. Thus, increases in real consumer incomes may affect both the vehicle
ownership rates and the age distribution of vehicles not only through the entry
of lower-income consumers into vehicle ownership, but also by making the
ownership of more than one vehicle affordable to an increasingly larger fraction
of the population. Allowing multiple vehicle ownership and/or adding another
dimension to vehicle differentiation would also prolong the period of aging
of the vehicle stock, and postpone the eventual decline in the average age of
vehicles predicted by the model. These extensions of the model are left for
future research.
Overall, this chapter makes an important step in studying the non-
stationarity of durable consumption with a dynamic discrete choice model,
that is both relatively simple and capable of replicating some of the important
features of the data. It shows that demand factors have a strong influence on
vehicle ownership decisions, including the ages of vehicles held, and changes
in these factors have contributed to the aging of the vehicle stock in the US.
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Chapter 3
How Does Income Inequality Affect Market
Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated
Markets?
In this chapter I study decisions of firms operating in a vertically differ-
entiated market. The products offered in such a market differ in quality. The
consumers are perfectly informed of the products’ characteristics and have the
same ranking over the products, preferring higher quality products to inferior
ones. Thus, if prices were the same, the consumers would all choose to buy the
top quality good. In this type of market the demand is directly affected by the
properties of consumers’ income distribution. If consumers have different in-
comes and thus, different willingness to pay for higher quality products, firms
can profitably split the market by offering products differentiated in qualities
at different prices. Therefore, in vertically differentiated markets, income in-
equality among consumers becomes a key factor in determining the product
varieties offered by the firms.
The purpose of this chapter is to study the effect of income inequality
on market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets. The line of research
linking income distribution of the consumers to the industry structure dates
back to Gabszewicz and Thisse [8], and has been cultivated by them [9] as well
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as by Shaked and Sutton ([18], [19], and [20]). These authors demonstrate that
the interplay of the industry cost structure and demand conditions, which are
the outcome of the underlying income distribution, determine the degree of
concentration and the maximum number of firms in vertically differentiated
markets (Shaked and Sutton [20]). They have almost nothing to say, however,
about what kind of products these firms would be producing.
The chapter most closely related to this one is Benassi, Chirco and
Colombo [4]. These authors analyze the effect of income concentration on
product differentiation and obtain solutions for quality and pricing decisions
of duopolistic firms. To obtain analytical results they assume that consumer
incomes are distributed with a trapezoid distribution, and that the market
is not covered. In this chapter I propose to further this research agenda by
modifying the existing models to make them applicable for studying the effects
of changes in the consumers’ income distribution on the firms’ entry decisions
and the optimal choices of product attributes and prices for a more general
specification of the income distribution function. I solve the model numerically
to obtain the equilibrium number of firms in the market, the qualities they
produce, and the prices they charge.
The most valuable insight from the present analysis is that income in-
equality among consumers affects the intensity of competition. The result
that greater income inequality enables more firms to enter the industry with
positive market shares dates back to Gabszewicz and Thisse [8] and has been
replicated in most of the works that followed. In this chapter I am also able
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to demonstrate that income inequality impacts the degree of product differen-
tiation in the market through its effect on the elasticity of consumer demand
for product quality. Greater inequality in consumer incomes results in more
intense quality competition among firms. This is due to the elasticity of mar-
ket demand for quality being higher in more inegalitarian economies. More
intense quality competition among firms causes them to locate their products
in higher ranges of the quality spectrum, closer to each other, decreasing the
degree of product differentiation. Competition between more similar products
tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high,
the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market,
and the low price elasticity of demand of these consumers allows him to charge
a higher price.
The model predicts that aggregate consumer welfare is higher in economies
with greater income inequality. Higher intensity of quality competition in these
economies induces lower-quality firms to raise the quality of their products and
offer these products at lower prices. Thus, the majority of consumers are better
off when income variability is high. Greater income inequality also decreases
the degree of product differentiation; therefore, on a quality-adjusted basis, we
are left with the counter intuitive result that consumption inequality is lower
in economies with a higher degree of income inequality.
The theoretical tool used in this project is an extension of the Shaked
and Sutton [18] model. In their seminal chapter the authors describe a model
of monopolistic competition in a vertically differentiated industry. They use
72
a three stage game to characterize industry equilibrium in which firms choose
both the qualities of their products and their prices. The outputs of their model
are the number of firms in the market, product qualities and prices, and the
major input is the income distribution of the consumers. In order to be able
to solve the model analytically, they make very specific assumptions about
the distribution of consumer incomes (uniform on [a, b], where 2a < b < 4a).
These assumptions enable the authors to obtain an analytical solution, but
make the environment of the model unfit for studying the effects of changes
in income distribution on market outcomes.
In this project I bypass the strict requirements for applicability of ana-
lytical tools by developing a computer code for solving the Shaked and Sutton
[18] model numerically for a more general and empirically relevant specifica-
tion of income distribution. After describing the model in Section 3.1, I outline
the solution method in Section 3.2. The discussion in this section also includes
the issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Section 3.3 of the chapter
gives the results of the model. Section 3.4 concludes with possible extensions
and plans for future research.
3.1 Model
The analysis here follows very closely that of Shaked and Sutton [18].
The economy is inhabited by two kinds of agents: consumers and firms. The
firms produce distinct, substitute goods, that are differentiated by quality.
Consumers are heterogeneous in income and have preferences over the goods
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produced by the firms, with the ordering of preferences being identical for all
consumers. They can choose to purchase only one good, basing their decision
on the choice of qualities they face and prices, or make no purchase. These
decisions generate demand functions for the firms, who face a more complicated
oligopolistic competition problem.
Each of the firms produces only one good. They compete in a three-
stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage each of the firms chooses
whether it would enter the market. In the second stage, upon observing the
number of entrants, firms that have entered the industry choose the specifica-
tions of their product, that is, its quality. In the last stage firms observe both
the number and quality choices of their rivals and set their prices.
The game is solved using Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium concept,
beginning at the last stage of the game and moving up the game tree.
3.1.1 Stage 3: Choosing Optimal Prices
Denote the number of firms that have entered the industry in stage 1
of the game by N . These firms produce distinct, substitute goods. Each firm
k = 1, ..., N produces a good of quality k. Denote the quality level of firm k’s
product by uk. These uk’s have been chosen at stage 2 of the game and at
the current stage are common knowledge. Assume these qualities are ordered
u0 < u1 < ... < uN ≤ u, where u0 is the quality of the outside good, and u is
an exogenous upper bound on quality. The price of the outside good is p0 = 0.
Each firm k is choosing the price of its product pk.
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The economy is inhabited by a continuum (measure one) of consumers
identical in tastes but heterogeneous in income. Each consumer has income t
which is distributed with a cdf F with support on [0,∞). Consumers purchase
only one good or make no purchase and consume an outside good k = 0. For
every consumer good k is characterized by the level of utility he/she obtains
from consuming good k, which is assumed to be equal to uk, and price of this
good pk. The preferences of consumer with income t from consuming good
(uk, pk) are described by utility function
1
U(t, (uk, pk)) = uk (t− pk). (3.1)
Define the income level tk such that a consumer with income tk is
indifferent between purchasing good k at price pk and good k−1 at price pk−1.
That is,
U(tk, (uk, pk)) = U(tk, (uk−1, pk−1)).
Let
Ik ≡ uk
uk − uk−1 ,
1This utility function is the same as in Shaked and Sutton [18]. The important assump-
tion on preferences is that consumer’s willingness to pay for quality is increasing in income.
Other types of utility functions can be used to describe preferences without significantly
altering the results of the model, as long as they satisfy this assumption.
75
where k = 1, ..., N . Note that Ik > 1 for all k.
Then t1 = p1I1 and
tk = pk−1(1− Ik) + pkIk. (3.2)
In this stage of the game the firms simultaneously choose their prices
so as to maximize their profits taking as given the prices of their rivals.
The profit of firm k is2
Πk = pk [F (tk+1)− F (tk)] (3.3)
for k = 1, ..., N − 1. The profit of firm k = N is
ΠN = pN [1− F (tN)].
Each firm k = 1, ..., N solves max
pk≥0
Πk. The solution is the best response
function (possibly, a correspondence) of firm k
pBRk = pk(p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ..., pN ; u1, ..., uN).
The system of these best response functions for k = 1, ..., N forms a
vector valued best response function. The Nash equilibrium of this game is
2There is a unit measure of consumers in this economy, thus, firm’s per capita and total
profits are the same. Also, profits are equivalent to revenues due to the assumption of zero
costs.
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the set of price functions
{
pNEk (u1, ..., uN)
}
k=1,...,N
that is a fixed point of this
vector valued best response function.
3.1.2 Stage 2: Choosing Optimal Qualities
In this stage of the game firms observe the number of entrants N and
simultaneously choose the quality of their own product uk, k = 1, ..., N .
Each firm solves:
max
u0<uk≤u
{
pNEk [F (t
NE
k+1)− F (tNEk )]
}
(3.4)
where pNEk = p
NE
k (u1, ..., uN) and t
NE
k = p
NE
k−1(1 − Ik) + pNEk Ik. Recall
also that Ik depends on both uk and uk−1. The equilibrium of this stage
of the game is a vector of qualities (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N), where u
∗
k is firm k’s best
response to u∗−k =
(
u∗1, ..., u
∗
k−1, u
∗
k+1, ...u
∗
N
)
for all k = 1, ..., N . Denote by
Π∗k the maximized value of profits of firm k, k = 1, ..., N , at (u
∗
1, ..., u
∗
N). The
equilibrium qualities and profits depend on the number of entrants in stage 1
of the game N .
3.1.3 Stage 1: Entry
Denote by ε the entry cost for any firm k. If a firm chooses to enter
this market it can expect to make EN [Π
∗
k(N)]. Thus, a firm will enter if
EN [Π
∗
k(N)] − ε ≥ 0. The number of firms in the market N∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if Π∗k(N
∗ + 1) − ε < 0 for some k. That is, the entry of an
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additional firm would lead to some firms making negative profits net of the
entry cost.
In what follows the entry cost ε is assumed to be very small, so as to
get the maximum possible number of entrants in the market. That is, N∗ is
considered to be an equilibrium number of firms if Π∗k(N
∗+1) = 0 for some k.
3.2 Solving the Model
In this section of the chapter I discuss the computational algorithm and
assumptions made in order to obtain the numerical solution of the model.
3.2.1 Assumptions
3.2.1.1 Consumers’ Income Distribution and Income Inequality
The consumers’ income distribution is assumed to be lognormal3 with
cdf F (µ, σ). Since the purpose of the chapter is to study the effect of income
inequality on firms’ decisions, parameters µ and σ are chosen so as to make
the variance of the income distribution vary, while keeping the mean income
constant. Denote the mean of the income distribution by A.
The standard measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. The
Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding
3The lognormal distribution is often used to model the real world income distributions.
The present computer code can be easily modified for another specification of the distri-
bution function. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the choice of a different
distribution function may affect the existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) properties of
the solution.
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to greater income inequality. According to the United Nations Development
Programme’s ”Human Development Report 2006” [23], it ranges from 0.19
in Azerbaijan to 0.74 in Namibia with an average of about 0.4 for the 126
countries in the report.4 The Gini coefficient can be calculated for a given
continuous cdf function as
G = 1− 1
A
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (y))2 dy,
For given µ and σ of the lognormal distribution the corresponding Gini
coefficient can be computed using the formula above. The parameter σ is al-
lowed to vary from 0.34 to 1.6. For each value of σ from this range, the value
of the parameter µ is then chosen so as to keep the mean of the distribution
constant at the chosen value for A. With these specifications the Gini coeffi-
cient varies from 0.19 to 0.74, which corresponds to the range observed in the
data.
3.2.1.2 Parameters Choice
To compute the model numerically it remains to specify the values
for the mean income A, the quality of the outside good u0, and the upper
bound on quality u. Section 3.3 of the chapter contains the results that have
been obtained for A = 15, u0 = 1, and u = 10. Robustness tests have
4According to the report, examples of countries with low income inequality include Den-
mark, Japan, and Sweden, all with Gini coefficients around 0.25 in 2006. In Europe Turkey
has the highest measure of income inequality at 0.44. US has a Gini coefficient of 0.41,
Canada - 0.33, and Mexico - 0.5.
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been performed to verify that different values of these parameters affect the
quantitative, but not the qualitative predictions of the model.
3.2.2 Computational Algorithm
The issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibria for these types of
models are typically not considered in the literature due to their extreme dif-
ficulty. Instead, the focus is on studying the characteristics which equilibria
must have, if they exist. When looking for a numerical solution of the model,
though, it is very important to know whether it exists and, if so, whether it
is unique. The model here has multiple stages, and existence and uniqueness
problems may arise at each of them. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of
the problem the analytical proofs are not feasible for any part of the game.
I turn to the numerical methods to verify existence and uniqueness or multi-
plicity of equilibria.
The computer code used to solve the model has been written with an
explicit goal of making it possible to verify at any stage of the game that what
is being found as a solution is in fact an equilibrium and, if so, whether there
are other equilibria besides the one being computed. This requirement makes
the computations more cumbersome and less efficient by necessitating that a
different procedure be used for computing stages 2 and 3 of the model for each
value of N .
The model is solved using Matlab software. The procedure is repeated
for different values of µ and σ to study the effects of changes in income dis-
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tribution function parameters on the model outcomes. For each value of N
stages 2 and 3 of the model are written as functions. The stage 3 function
takes as given the vector of qualities (u1, ..., uN) and produces the vector of
Nash equilibrium prices
(
pNE1 (u1, ..., uN), ..., p
NE
N (u1, ..., uN)
)
. This function is
called upon in the body of the stage 2 function, which, for a particular value
of N , attempts to compute the Nash equilibrium qualities (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N). If it
finds that the equilibrium qualities converge to only one point, the one where
all firms want to produce u, it concludes that the Nash equilibrium with firms
producing distinct qualities does not exist for a given number of entrants N .5
The main body of the code then calls upon another stage 2 function, the one
for smaller N , to see if there is an equilibrium with desired properties for a
less crowded market. The procedure stops when it finds the maximum N for
which there exists an equilibrium vector of qualities (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) with u
∗
i 6= u∗j
for all i, j = 1, ..., N , i 6= j and u∗i , u∗j ∈ (u0, u]. This number of firms is the
equilibrium N∗.
Here is a brief outline of the procedure:
I. Specify parameters µ and σ of the income distribution function.
II. Make a guess about the initial number of firms in the market N0.
5For N > 2 there is always an equilibrium with all firms producing the top quality u.
If two or more firms produce u, the Bertrand competition at stage 3 ensures that all firms
earn zero profits in equilibrium.
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III. Call a stage 2 function for N = N0 which seeks to find the Nash equi-
librium qualities (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N). This function uses the stage 3 function to
compute Nash equilibrium prices for any distribution of firms’ qualities.
IV. If this stage 2 function finds (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) with u
∗
i 6= u∗j , i 6= j for all
i, j = 1, ..., N , consider increasing N0 to N0 = N0+1 to check that there
does not exist a solution with desired properties for a greater number of
firms in the market. That is, let N0 = N0 + 1 and go back to step III.
V. If the stage 2 function does not find (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) such that u
∗
i 6= u∗j , i 6= j
for all i, j = 1, ..., N , and instead concludes that the only solution is
u∗k = u for all k = 1, ..., N , then let N0 = N0 − 1.
VI. Call a stage 2 function for this smaller N = N0.
VII. If the stage 2 function concludes that the only solution is u∗k = u for all
k = 1, ..., N , then let N0 = N0 − 1 and go back to step VI.
VIII. If the stage 2 function finds (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) with u
∗
i 6= u∗j , i 6= j for all
i, j = 1, ..., N , then call this number of firms the equilibrium N∗ and
the quality vector (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) the solution to the stage 2 of the game.
Compute the Nash equilibrium prices for this vector of qualities using
the stage 3 function.
The optimal choice of initial N would be N0 = N
∗ + 1, and depends
on the parameters A, u0, and u. For their values specified above N0 = 4 is
sufficient.
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Next I discuss the algorithms for computing stage 2 and 3 equilibria in
greater detail, also addressing the issues of their existence and uniqueness.
3.2.2.1 Stage 3: Computing Optimal Prices
The input of the stage 3 function is a vector of firms’ qualities (u1, ..., uN).
Each firm k = 1, ..., N optimally chooses its price pk so as to maximize its
profit, taking the prices of other firms p−k = (p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ..., pN) as given.
For a given vector p−k this is a simple single-variable constrained optimization
problem, and the best response function can be computed as pBRk = pk(p−k).
Any point where the best response functions of all firms k = 1, ...N intersect is
a Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game. Visual tests conducted for differ-
ent income distribution specifications, N = 2, 3, 4, and various combinations
of qualities (u1, ..., uN) lead to the conclusion that the point of intersection
exists and is unique. I use the method of simple iterations on best response
functions to find this unique Nash equilibrium. This method is the most simple
and reliable. It can be slower than the alternative methods, but unreliability
of other methods in this case prevents their meaningful use.6
6An alternative solution method would involve solving the system of first-order condi-
tions. The more efficient numerical methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations are
based on replacing the problem with that of minimizing a functional. The surface of this
functional turns out to have a very irregular shape due to the assumption of the lognormal
probability density function. As a result, the solution obtained using these methods is very
sensitive to the initial guess.
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3.2.2.2 Stage 2: Computing Optimal Qualities
For a given N the stage 2 function searches for an equilibrium vector
of qualities (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) such that no two elements of this vector are the same.
Notice that each particular vector (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N) corresponds to N ! equilibria in
terms of the identities of the firms. To illustrate, suppose that two firms X
and Y enter the market at stage 1. If there is an equilibrium with firm X
producing u∗1 and firm Y producing u
∗
2, then there is also an equilibrium with
Y producing u∗1 and X producing u
∗
2. For all purposes here these symmetric
equilibria are considered to be identical and are treated as one equilibrium.
Thus, when looking for equilibria with two firms producing distinct qualities
I will assume that one of the firms is producing the lower quality good while
the other one is making the higher quality one, and they both know their
respective positions. For N = 3 the respective quality positions for each of
the firms are ”fixed” at low, middle, and high. There is a similar preassigned
ordering for larger N .
In the model with no costs to producing higher quality the top qual-
ity firm’s best response to any quality choices by its rivals is uN = u. For
N = 2 the problem at this stage is a simple one of finding u1 that maximizes
firm 1’s profit, taking as given u2 = u and the price functions from stage 3(
pNE1 (u1, u) , p
NE
2 (u1, u)
)
. For N = 3 the procedure is looking for an intersec-
tion point of the quality best response functions for firms 1 and 2 when u3 = u
and the price functions from stage 3 are(
pNE1 (u1, u2, u) , p
NE
2 (u1, u2, u) , p
NE
3 (u1, u2, u)
)
. Denote the quality best re-
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sponse function of firm 1 by u1 = q1 (u2, u) and that of firm 2 by u2 = q2 (u1, u).
Below I plot four examples, each for an economy with a different value of the
Gini coefficient, illustrating four possible situations for equilibria in this stage
of the game.
Figure 3.1: Equilibria in stage 2 of the game, N = 3
In Figure 3.1a the quality best response functions of firms 1 and 2 do
not intersect in any point besides the one where they both produce u. When
this is the case, there does not exist an equilibrium with firms producing
differentiated products. The best response functions in Figure 3.1b and Figure
3.1d coincide in one other point besides (u, u), point S1. The conclusion in
these two cases is that the equilibrium with desired properties exists and is
85
unique. In Figure 3.1c the best response functions intersect in two other points,
S1 and S2, where u1, u2 6= u. Thus, potentially there are two solutions with
firms producing distinct qualities. The equilibrium at S2 cannot be computed
by any procedure involving iterations, since it is non-stable. The code uses the
simple iterations methods to compute the quality choices corresponding to S1.
The quality vector with thus chosen u1 and u2 is the solution for this stage of
the game.
Similar graphs can be obtained for N > 3. Let N = 4 and denote
the quality best response functions of the three lower quality firms by u1 =
q1 (u2, u3, u), u2 = q2 (u1, u3, u), and u3 = q3 (u1, u2, u). For each (u3, u) let
u1 be the solution to u1 = q1 (q2 (u1, u3, u) , u3, u) obtained by the method of
simple iterations. Similarly, u3 solves u3 = q3 (u1, q2 (u1, u3, u) , u) for every
(u1, u). Denote these solutions by
ˆ
u1 =
ˆ
q1 (u3, u) and
ˆ
u3 =
ˆ
q3 (u1, u). The
problem becomes that of finding an intersection of functions
ˆ
q1 (u3, u) and
ˆ
q3 (u1, u), if it exists. This task is analogous to the one described for the case
of N = 3 above. A similar procedure can be used for N > 4.
3.3 Results
The degree of income dispersion, measured by the Gini coefficient (G),
determines the equilibrium number of firms in the market. In the economies
with G ≤ 0.2492 only two firms choose to enter the market, that is, N∗ = 2. If
another firm was to enter, the competition for the consumers with such small
degree of heterogeneity would be so intense that it would drive the price of
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the top quality firm to zero, causing all firms to earn zero profits. Thus, in
equilibrium only two firms in the market earn positive profits.
Economies with values of G above that threshold are inhabited by con-
sumers whose incomes are distributed less equally. Greater degree of consumer
heterogeneity gives the firms more ”room” to compete. As a result, up to three
firms can enter the market in these economies and earn positive profits and the
equilibrium number of firms is N∗ = 3. Thus, income inequality determines
the number of firms that can coexist in a vertically differentiated industry
with positive market shares, with more firms inhabiting the markets in less
egalitarian economies.
In the model with no costs to producing higher quality the top quality
firm always chooses to produce the highest possible quality u = 10. The
optimal quality choices of other firms depend on the degree of differentiation
in consumers’ incomes. Figures 3.2a and 3.2b give, respectively, equilibrium
quality and price decisions of firms as functions of the Gini coefficient G. The
dotted vertical line is drawn at G = 0.2492 to separate the cases for N∗ = 2
and N∗ = 3. Figure 3.2c depicts the income levels of the marginal consumers,
tk’s. Recall that a consumer with income tk is indifferent between purchasing
from firm k and k − 1. Thus, for example, in economies where three firms
enter the market, the demand for the top quality firm is given by the fraction
of population with incomes above t3, the consumers with incomes between t2
and t3 buy from the second highest quality firm, those with incomes between
t1 and t2 purchase the good of the lowest quality, and the rest choose not to
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buy and consume the outside good.
Figure 3.2: Results of the model with no costs
The optimal qualities are increasing functions of G, and equilibrium
prices of firms producing the lowest and the second highest quality products
are lower in the economies with higher levels of consumer income inequality.
The price of the top quality product is decreasing at first, and then becomes an
increasing function of G for the values of this parameter above some threshold
value. To analyze these results of the model with no costs, consider four
hypothetical economies, each characterized by a different value of the income
inequality measure G.
Figure 3.3 below gives the consumer income distributions for each of
these four economies. The economies are ordered by the degree of inequality
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in the consumer incomes, with Economy 1 inhabited by consumers with the
most equal distribution of incomes. The vertical lines mark the income levels
of the marginal consumers, tk’s, and the shaded areas of the graphs represent
the demands for each of the firms or, equivalently, their market shares.
Figure 3.3: Probability density functions of consumer
incomes in Economies 1 through 4 and mar-
ket shares of firms
As G increases, the income distribution becomes more skewed to the
left. The most prevalent type of consumer (the income distribution peaks at
his income level) becomes increasingly more poor from Economy 1 to Econ-
omy 4, while the fraction of consumers with incomes in the middle range is
rapidly shrinking. The probability density functions of consumer incomes in
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the economies with greater income inequality are characterized by thicker tails,
which means that these economies also have more consumers with incomes
above the mean.
Consumers with higher incomes constitute the more attractive market
for the firms, since for each level of quality wealthier consumers have higher
willingness to pay. In the economies with a more egalitarian distribution of
incomes the most attractive market for the firms is composed of the middle
income consumers, since they are the most prevalent type. Low variability
of incomes in this group results in small differences in willingness to pay for
higher quality, and thus lower elasticity of demand for the top quality product.
This allows the top quality producer to capture most of the market by pricing
low enough to keep its inferior quality competitor serving the relatively more
poor part of the population.
Intuitively, greater homogeneity of consumer incomes leads to more
intense price competition in the last stage of the game. Its effects can only
be mitigated through greater degree of product differentiation. If more than
two firms were to enter in the Economy 1, they would not be able to locate
far enough from each other in the quality spectrum in stage 2 of the game to
sufficiently lessen the intensity of price competition in stage 3.
Greater income inequality increases the variability of incomes of the
consumers in the more attractive, higher income part of the market, making
the demand for quality more elastic. The second highest quality firm can now
benefit by increasing the quality of its product without causing a knockout
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price competition in the last stage of the game. Thus, the quality of the
second highest quality good increases and the prices of two higher quality
firms decline until the middle income market becomes too small for both of
the firms to share, and the highest quality good producer ”gives up” these
middle class consumers to serve exclusively the rich.
Figure 3.2a shows that the quality of the second highest quality good
is increasing in G, that is, in the degree of income inequality. In Figure 3.2b
the price of this good is decreasing in G, while the price of its higher quality
competitor is ”U” - shaped. The equilibrium price of the top quality product
begins to increase in economies with very high levels of income inequality be-
cause the consumers purchasing it are so wealthy that their demand is inelastic
for higher values of prices. Figure 3.2c also shows that the marginal consumer
of the top quality firm (t3) is becoming increasingly richer after some value of
G.
Additional results are demonstrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Figures 3.4a
and 3.4b give market shares and profits of firms. Increases in income inequality
induce the low quality firm to produce better quality product and charge lower
price. Combined with the increase in the proportion of the relatively poor
consumers in the population, this leads to greater market share and higher
profits for the low quality firm. The market share and profits of the top quality
firm decrease in the level of income inequality of the consumers. Greater
inequality of incomes results in more intense quality competition between the
two top quality producers, enabling the second highest quality firm to steal
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some business from its top quality competitor. The shrinking middle class
eventually leads to the decline in the second highest quality producer’s market
share as well. The market shares of all firms get closer to each other in size as
the income distribution becomes more unequal, causing the concentration to
fall with greater degree of income inequality (Figure 3.5a).
Figure 3.4: Additional results: market shares, profits,
and market coverage
Figure 3.4c shows the total fraction of consumers in the market that
choose to purchase from one of the firms as a function of the degree of inequality
in incomes. Observe that at G = 0.2492, when an additional firm chooses
to enter the market, the market is almost covered. Further increases in the
income inequality measure are manifested in larger fraction of the consumers
with low incomes, who cannot be induced to buy even the lowest quality
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Figure 3.5: Additional results: concentration and con-
sumer welfare
good, notwithstanding its lower price and better quality. The consumers that
do end up purchasing from one of the firms benefit from the more intense
price and quality competition among the firms that accompany increases in
income inequality. Thus, aggregate consumer welfare is higher in economies
with greater degree of income inequality (Figure 3.5b).
3.4 Conclusion and Further Plans
In this chapter I study how income inequality among consumers affects
the decisions of firms operating in vertically differentiated industries. The
model used to address this question is due to Shaked and Sutton [18]. This
model makes the following important assumptions: a) each consumer chooses
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at most one good out of a variety of products differentiated in quality; b)
consumers have different incomes, and consumers with higher incomes are
willing to pay more for better products; c) the products are supplied by firms
that compete by choosing qualities and prices in a non-cooperative three-stage
game, with each firm supplying only one type of quality; and d) there are no
fixed or variable costs to producing higher quality products. In order to study
the effects of changes in income inequality on model outcomes, I assume a
lognormal distribution for consumer incomes and solve the model numerically,
holding the mean of the distribution constant while changing the variance.
The results demonstrate that income inequality impacts the degree of
product differentiation in the market through its effect on the elasticity of
consumer demand for product quality. The industries in the economies with
greater income inequality are characterized by a greater number of firms and
more intense quality competition. This is due to the demand for quality being
more elastic in the economies with less egalitarian distributions of incomes. In
the model with no costs to producing higher quality the top quality product is
always produced independently of the degree of consumer heterogeneity, but
the qualities of other firms’ products rise with the increases in income inequal-
ity. The more intense quality competition induces firms to locate their prod-
ucts in higher ranges of the quality spectrum and closer to each other. Thus,
higher income inequality among consumers decreases the degree of product
differentiation in the market. Lower heterogeneity of product qualities leads
to more intense price competition, pushing down the prices of all firms in the
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market. However, in the economies where income inequality is very high, the
top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich consumers; their demand is
more price inelastic, which enables him to charge a higher price. Also, market
shares and profits of all firms are distributed more equally in less egalitarian
economies, and the consumers are better of in terms of aggregate welfare.
An important extension of the model would involve relaxing the as-
sumption of zero costs to producing higher quality products. When costs are
zero, the top quality level is always produced. It would be interesting to see
how the cost structure would affect the level of the highest quality on offer,
and how the results would depend on the degree of income heterogeneity. The
results for the model with positive fixed and/or variable costs can also be
tested empirically.7 This is left for future research.
7Berry and Waldfogel [5] empirically investigate how market size affects the level of top
quality on offer and product concentration in vertically differentiated industries. One of
the industries they study is the restaurants industry in the US. The data sources they use
are rich enough to allow investigation of the effects of income inequality on the degree of
product differentiation and price levels.
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A Data Description
A.1 The US Motor Vehicle Stock
The annual data on the total number of cars and trucks, the number
of new vehicles registered, the distribution of vehicles by model year, and the
prices of new cars come from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [24]. The
publication has been produced by Ward’s Communications since 1938, and is
a comprehensive annual report on the state of the US automotive industry. In
every issue, the selected statistics are reported for the given year and several
previous years, so the numbers for the years prior to 1982 could be obtained
from the more recent issues.
R.L. Polk & Co. is the original source for the data on the total number
vehicles in use, new vehicle registrations, and the distribution of vehicle vin-
tages. In every year, the statistics are presented separately for cars and trucks.
For the purposes of this project, the numbers for cars and trucks were added
to obtain aggregate statistics. The mean age data are also provided separately
for cars and trucks. In every year, the mean age of all vehicles was calculated
as the weighted average of the mean ages of cars and trucks.
The Ward’s Automotive Yearbook also publishes the average expendi-
ture per new car in every year. The editors obtain these data from the US
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, as the average trans-
action price per new car. They also compute an estimate of the average new
car price for a 1967 ”comparable car”, by adding the value of safety and emis-
sions equipment as determined by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to
97
the 1967 average transaction price, and inflating this sum to current dollars
using the BLS ”New Car Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers.”
A.2 Household Income
The data on the mean income of households and the Gini ratios for the
years 1967-2001 were obtained from the Historical Income Tables compiled by
the US Census Bureau from the Annual Social and Economic Supplements to
the Current Population Survey (CPS).
A.3 Households and vehicles
The data on vehicle ownership by households were obtained from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) [6]. The survey is administered by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The Interview Survey component of the CE
is collected on a quarterly basis, with households in the sample interviewed
every three months over a fifteen-month period.8 However, income questions
are asked only in the first and fourth quarter. For every survey year in the
sample, the data on size, location, and total income before taxes over the
past twelve months were chosen for every household interviewed in the first
quarter. The income data were used to sort the households by income groups,
the bounds for which were computed using the CPS data. The incomplete
8The unit of observation in the CE is a consumer unit, which is comprised of all persons in
the household that share expenditures on housing, food, and other living expenses. Although
there is a difference between households as defined by the US Census Bureau and the
consumer units of CE, it is small, and for the purposes of this project these are assumed to
be the same units.
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income respondents were excluded from the sample. The average size of the
final sample for the 1980 – 2002 surveys is 7, 760 households in every year.
The data on vehicles are reported in the Detailed Expenditure Files
component of the survey. For every household in the sample, the BLS collects
the information on vehicles owned by the household. The survey asks detailed
questions about every vehicle owned by the household, including its make and
model year, the year it was purchased, and whether it was new or used at
the time of purchase. Starting in 1991, similar questions about leased vehicles
were added to the survey. The information on the vehicle’s model year is
particularly important for the purposes of this project, since it is used to
compute the age of the vehicle. Unfortunately, for some of the model years,
the CE reports ranges instead of actual years. For example, in 2002, the model
year is recorded precisely for models produced after 1987. The survey gives
ranges for older vintages. For the 1990 issue this ”cut-off” year is 1986. Thus,
computing the vehicle age statistic is more problematic in the earlier issues of
the survey. However, it is still possible to establish the motivating pattern of
poorer households on average owning older vehicles.
B Multiple Vehicle Ownership
This appendix provides some evidence that vehicles of different vintages
are substitutes at the household level.
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Figure B.1: Average age of vehicles among households
Table B.1: Determinants of vehicle ownership and ages of vehicles
owned
Independent
variable
I. Probit:
Own a
vehicle
II. Tobit:
Vehicle’s
age
III.
Probit:
Pur-
chased
used
IV. OLS:
Number
of years
own
(new)
Income, $1000
0.0203 −0.0525 −0.0140 −0.0115
(15.86) (−18.8) (−20.27) (−2.51)
Income squared
−0.00004 0.00011 0.00003 0.00003
(−12.18) (11.47) (13.55) (1.71)
Luxury vehicle
0.0692 0.1997 −0.6086
(0.25) (2.98) (−1.44)
Num. of other
vehicles
1.0606 0.1359 0.5280
(20.93) (11) (4.42)
R2 0.1899 0.0203 0.0975 0.0824
Number of
obs.
6, 381 10, 334 10, 283 3, 757
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey [6].
1) t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
2) Other controls include a constant, family size, number of earn-
ers, geographic location, population, origin of the vehicle (Domes-
tic, European, Asian), truck indicator, age and age squared of the
reference person.
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The summary statistics in Figure B.1 were also computed separately for
households in the top income decile, so as to control for the effect of income.
The regression analysis indicates that household size is an important factor in
vehicle ownership decisions, so the sample was also limited to households with
two persons over the age of sixteen. The location of the household was con-
trolled for as well, through the exclusion of rural households from the sample.
In this subsample, the average age of vehicles in households with more than
one vehicle is also always higher than the average age of vehicles in households
with one vehicle only.
Table B.1 shows that the number of other vehicles owned has a positive
and strongly significant effect on the age of the vehicle held. This seems to be
due to households with more vehicles purchasing or leasing a larger fraction
of them used, and holding on to them longer.
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